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NOTES

VIEWING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ACCESS
ACT THROUGH THE LENS OF FEDERALISM

INTRODUCTION

In the early morning of September 29, 1994, six individuals
began their mission. In clandestine fashion, three of the men
wedged a Plymouth automobile into the front entranceway of a
clinic and welded themselves to the car. One of the men placed his
lower body on the ground through a hole cut in the car's floorboard.' Meanwhile, the other three men blockaded the rear door of
the building with a second automobile and similarly welded themselves to it.' One of them sat in the driver's seat and was "restrained by a welded steel device confining his head in a steel
harness, which was located around his head by placing a carjack
inside a hollow steel pipe."3 The second one "was in a hole cut in
the passenger-side floorboard, with his lower body resting on the
pavement and his upper body confined inside an electric clothes
dryer. His head was restrained in a locked harness secured around
his throat." Finally, the third man "was in the right rear passenger
seat with his arm encased and handcuffed inside a steel pipe."5
This striking event transpired at the entrance of the Wisconsin
Women's Health Care Center in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. The six
men were pro-life crusaders who, following in the tradition of civil
rights demonstrators three decades earlier,6 resorted to nonviolent
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

See United States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675, 677 (7th Cir. 1995).
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id
Some pro-life demonstrators in the 1990s draw a parallel between their cause and
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civil disobedience as a means of protesting what they believed was
the subjugation of higher principles and moral imperatives by a
morally bankrupt social and legal hierarchy. Their actions had
some impact. It took several hours for the Milwaukee fire depart-

ment to extricate the men using "hydraulic equipment, blow torches, saws, and pry bars in the process." 7 However, while state and

local officials could have adequately dealt with the disruption at
the clinic, the six men were not indicted under state law. Instead,
federal authorities indicted them under the Freedom of Access to

Clinic Entrances Act of 1994 ("Access Act"). The Access Act is
a federal statute enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause9 in

response to the increasingly confrontational tactics employed by
anti-abortion demonstrators-including a few cases of extreme
violence."0

Legislation like the Access Act has been subject to growing
criticism. Critics argue that such legislation intrudes on the authority of the states over their criminal jurisdictions under the guise of
the Commerce Clause." Indeed, one judge described the Access
Act as "federal overkill."'2 However, until very recently the seemingly interminable advance toward federalizing crime, much of it
local, has been criticized primarily in prudential rather than constitutional terms. 3 Fortunately, however, the Supreme Court's 1995

the actions of civil rights demonstrators in the 1960s. See, e.g., Steven Manning, Civil
Warriors?, SCHOLASTIC UPDATE, Apr. 20, 1990, at 17, available in LEXIS, NEXIS library, ARCNWS file.
7. Wilson, 73 F.3d at 677.
8. 18 U.S.C. § 248 (1994) (providing civil and criminal penalties for some types of
interference with access to reproductive health service providers and places of worship).
The Access Act has also been referred to by the acronym FACE.
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3.
10. See infra note 30 and accompanying text.
11. There is no difficulty if federal criminal law displaces state law that is already
addressing a particular problem. The Supreme Court has "rejected the suggestion that Congress invades areas reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment simply because it
exercises its authority under the Commerce Clause in a manner that displaces the States'
exercise of their police powers." Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n,
452 U.S. 264, 291 (1981) (citations omitted); see also Larry Kramer, UnderstandingFederalism, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1485, 1496 (1994) (arguing that while the Constitution sets up
separate spheres for the federal and tate governments, it also provided for concurrent
spheres of authority "where state law would govern unless and until displaced by positive
federal enactment"). The dilemma, instead, is whether the Commerce Clause has been
interpreted so broadly that it intrudes on spheres that were originally intended to be the
exclusive domain of the states. That is the focus of this Note.
12. See Wilson, 73 F.3d at 698 (Coffey, J.,dissenting).
13. See, e.g., Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief- The Federalization of American
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decision in United States v. Lopez 4 has revitalized the debate

over the proper role of the federal government in our constitutional
scheme, and has spawned much bommentary in the process. 5 In

this climate, the federal criminalization of obstructive anti-abortion
activities under the Access Act is an excellent area of law to de-

bate federalism. While this area involves federal constitutional
concerns (i.e. abortion rights), it entails the regulation of activities
that are generally wholly local in nature and, for the most part,
have an attenuated
connection to "Commerce... among the sever6

al States.'

This Note joins the debate over what the proper scope of the
commerce power should be in a system of enumerated powers. It

analyzes the judicial attempts at squaring the Access Act with the
Constitution and addresses the constitutionality of the Access Act
under a new method of analysis of the Commerce Clause. Part I
begins with a historical background of the events leading to the
passage of the Access Act. Then, in order to establish a framework
for a departure from traditional Commerce Clause jurisprudence,
Part I traces the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence

since its inception in the early nineteenth century, its radical transformation during the New Deal, and finally its reassessment by the
Court in Lopez. Part I then explores the competing views of federalism arising out of Lopez and articulates a federalism framework
under which to analyze the several cases that have addressed the

Criminal Law, 46 HASTINGS LJ. 1135, 1165-74 (1995) (arguing that involving federal
courts in criminal matters is often a waste of resources).
14. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995). The Court in Lopez struck down the Gun-Free School
Zones Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (1995). See id. at 1626. It was the first
time in nearly six decades that a federal statute has fallen on Commerce Clause grounds.
See Id. at 1633. See infra Part I, Section B, subsection 6.
15. For example, Professor Ackerman described Lopez as "one of the opening cannonades in the coming constitutional revolution." Stuart Taylor, Jr., Judging With Pinpoint
Accuracy, THE RECORDER (San Francisco), May 8, 1995, at 10, available in LEXIS,
NEXIS, LEGNEWS library. On the other hand, other commentators have argued that
Lpez does not represent a rejuvenated federalism. See, e.g., Kathleen F. Brickey, Crime
Control and the Commerce Clause: Life After Lopez, 46 CAsE W. RES. L. REv. 801, 839
(1996) (arguing that Lopez is more significant for its symbolic value than as a revisitation
of Commerce Clause jurisprudence); Robert F. Nagel, The Future of Federalism, 46 CASE
W. REs. L. REV. 643, 661 (1996) (arguing that those perceiving Lopez as a hopeful sign
for federalism "are looking for the future in the wrong place"). But see Melvyn R.
Durchslag, Will the Real Alfonzo Lopez Please Stand Up: A Reply to Professor Nagel,
46 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 671, 672 (1996) ("[mly sense is that Chief Justice Rehnquist
has bigger fish to fry than 18 U.S.C. § 922(q).").
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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constitutionality of the Access Act. Finally, Part II articulates a
standard to guide post-Lopez courts construing the Commerce
Clause. It proposes a commercial activities test to establish substantive limits to what is now a virtually unlimited commerce power.
Under this Note's proposal, certain spheres of activity would be
outside the scope of the commerce power, notwithstanding their
effects on interstate commerce. Within one of these spheres is the
activity regulated by the Access Act.
I. BACKGROUND ON THE ACCESS Acr AND THE EVOLUTION OF
THE SUPREME COURT'S COMMERCE CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE

A. Freedom of Access to Clinic EntrancesAct of 1994
The Access Act of 1994 was enacted to safeguard the freedom
of access to "reproductive health"'7 clinics in the face of a rising
level of force, threat of force, and physical obstruction used by
anti-abortion demonstrators to intimidate and prevent women from
seeking an abortion. 8 Specifically, the Access Act targets abortion
protestors who employ blockages, assaults, and other confrontational tactics, including violence and threats. 9 The Act provides
criminal penalties?° and civil remedies21 against any individual
who:
(1) by force or threat of force or by physical obstruction,
intentionally injures, intimidates or interferes with or attempts to injure, intimidate or interfere with any person
because that person is or has been, or in order to intimidate such person or any other person or any class of per-

17. Reproductive health services are defined as "services provided in a hospital, clinic,
physician's office, or other facility, and includes medical, surgical, counseling, or referral
services relating to the human reproductive system, including services relating to pregnancy or the termination of pregnancy." 18 U.S.C. § 248(e)(5).
18. See H.R. REP. No. 103-306, at 3 (1993), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 699, 700.
19. See H.R. REP. No. 103-306, at 3.
20. See 18 U.S.C. § 248(b). The Access Act provides a term of less than one year for
first offenses (plus fines), a prison term of not more than three years for second or subsequent offenses (plus fines). However, for nonviolent physical obstruction the Access Act
provides a prison term of less than six months for a first offense (fines no more than
$10,000), and a prison term of less than 18 months for subsequent offenses ($25,000
fine). See 18 U.S.C. § 248(b).
21. See 18 U.S.C. § 248(c). For nonviolent physical obstruction, the Access Act provides a $10,000 fine for first offenses and a $15,000 fine for subsequent offenses; a
$15,000 fine for other first-time offenses and a $25,000 for other subsequent offenses. See
18 U.S.C. § 248(c).
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sons from, obtaining or providing reproductive health services;
or

(3) intentionally damages or destroys the property of a
facility, or attempts to do so, because such facility provides
reproductive health services.... '
The legislative history of the Access Act details lengthy findings set forth by Congress to justify the statute, and offers evidence of the effect that anti-abortion demonstration violence has on
interstate commerce' The findings describe "an interstate campaign of violence and obstruction aimed at closing the facilities or
physically blocking ingress to them, and intimidating those seeking
to obtain or provide abortion-related services."'24 Moreover, the
findings state that "nationwide campaign of anti-abortion blockades,
invasions, vandalism and outright violence" interferes with

women's access to abortion services and that federal regulation is
necessary to ameliorate the "already severe shortage" of abortion

providers in the country.'s Congress found, for example, that from
1977 to April, 1993, there had been more than 1,000 reports of
acts of violence against abortion providers-including at least 36
bombings, 81 arsons, 137 death threats, 84 assaults, 2 kidnappings,
327 clinic invasions, and 1 murder. According to Congress, this
"interstate campaign of violence" does more than merely handicap
abortion providers and injure patients. It also overwhelms state and

22. 18 U.S.C. § 248(a). The Access Act has a potentially broad reach. As written, it is
not limited to violent conduct in the vicinity of abortion clinics but reaches back to conduct completely removed from a clinic's location. Thus, an individual who threatened the
use of force against a woman in her home because she obtained an abortion could be
subject to penalties. See Laurence Tribe, The Constitutionality of the Freedom of Access
to Clinic Entrances Act of 1993, 1 VA. J. Soc. PoL'Y & L. 291, 294 (1994) (arguing in
testimony that patients and doctors who are threatened at their home could be subject to
the Access Act, but that this provision of the Access Act is still constitutionally valid
under the Commerce Clause).
23. Congress explicitly stated that it was acting pursuant to its affirmative power to
enact legislation under Article I, section 8 of the Constitution. See 18 U.S.C. § 248(b).
The Access Act provides that its purpose is "to protect and promote the public safety and
health and activities affecting interstate commerce by establishing [flederal criminal penalties and civil remedies for certain violent, threatening, obstructive and destructive conduct
that is intended to injure, intimidate or interfere with persons seeking to obtain or provide
reproductive health services." § 248.
24. S. 636, 103d Cong. § 2(a)(1) (1993).
25. S. REP. No. 103-117, at 3 (1993).
26. See S. REP. No. 103-117, at 3.
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local law enforcement's ability to deal with it.27 To compound
matters, some local law enforcement agencies have not only been
unable but sometimes unwilling to protect abortion providers and
patients from such violence.'
The passage of the Access Act was influenced by additional
factors. While this was not the first time that Congress had considered legislation to criminalize obstructive anti-abortion activities,29

congressional action on the Access Act was likely prompted by
increasing publicity of the confrontational tactics employed by
abortion clinic protestors, including the highly publicized murder of

an abortion doctor in Pensacola, Florida.

Another factor was the

Supreme Court's decision in Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health
Clinic" which held that the conspiracy section of the Ku Klux
Klan Act32 was inapplicable to anti-abortion activities.33 As a result, federal relief was effectively unavailable to restrain anti-abortion violence and blockades.
Opponents of the Access Act claimed that state trespass and
obstruction statutes had already punished thousands of anti-abortion
demonstrators' and that the Access Act would unduly intrude on
27. See S. 636 § 2(a)(5).
28. See S. REP. No. 103-117, at 19; H.R. REP. No. 103-306, at 10.
29. In 1991, for example, United States Representative Meldon E. Levine (D-Cal.)
proposed an even broader bill, HR. 1703, 102d Cong. (1991), designed to make felonious
any interference with the free access to abortion clinics.
30. On March 10, 1993, Michael F. Griffin shot and killed Dr. David Gunn outside
the Pensacola Women's Medical Services Clinic, operated by Gunn. See Clinic Doctor
Killed During Abortion Protest, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 11, 1993, at IA. This was
the first reported slaying in the fight over abortion. See iL
31. 506 U.S. 263 (1993).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1994).
33. See H.. CONF. REP. No. 103-488, at 7 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.CAN.
699, 724-25. Laurence Tribe commented on this during testimony on the Senate's version
of the Access Act:
In the wake of Bray, clinics and women must now largely rely on state courts
to issue injunctions and on local police to provide enforcement. But state and
local authorities, which are properly sensitive to the rights of peaceful protest
as well as to the rights of women seeking abortions, have at times been caught
in the middle and have not always provided adequate protection for the rights
of clinic patients and personnel, much as they might have wished to do so.
Tribe, supra note 22, at 307.
34. See H.R. REP. No. 103-306, at 21-22 (1993), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 690,
717 (dissenting views of Hon. F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.; Carlos F. Moorhead; Henry J.
Hyde; Bill McCollum; Howard Coble; Lamar S. Smith; Elton Gallegly, and Robert W.
Goodlatte). "Criminal trespass, criminal contempt, disorderly conduct, resisting arrest, and
unlawful assembly are examples of criminal statutes" used to punish anti-abortion activities. H.R. REP. No. 103-306 at 22, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 690, 717.
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the authority of states over their criminal jurisdictions.35 Nevertheless, Congress passed the Act and President Clinton signed it
into law on May 26, 1994.?' Ordinarily, the Access Act would
represent yet another contribution to the massive collection of
federal law comprising a national police power," much of which
increasingly deals with local activities. 9 The Lopez decision, however, has provided legal ammunition to upset a whole body of
federal regulation under the Commerce Clause, particularly those
regulations touching upon local matters. Before Lopez, it was not
unrealistic to assume the commerce power had grown into a virtually unlimited federal power under the Supreme Court's jurisprudence. The next section thus carefully traces the evolution of Commerce Clause jurisprudence so as to analyze the potentially farreaching implications of Lopez.
B. Commerce Clause History-Determiningthe
Limits of an Enumerated Power

1. From Marshall to The New Deal
The Commerce Clause grants to Congress the power "[tio
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian Tribes."' Our understanding of this

35. See Clinic Blockades: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime and Criminal Justice
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 124 (1992) ("Trespass on private
property is a wholly intrastate activity (as exemplified by the trespass regulations of the
fifty states). Congress lacks the constitutional authority to enact such laws.").
36. The final version of the bill passed in the House on May 5, 1994 by a vote of
241 to 174 and in the Senate on May 12 by a vote of 69 to 30. FAcTS ON FIE (1994),
available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, Facts on File.
37. See Michael Kranish, Ban on Abortion Clinic Strife Signed, BOSTON GLOBE, May
27, 1994, at 3. The children of slain abortion clinic doctor Dr. David Gunn joined President Clinton at the White House signing ceremony. See id.
38. Over 3,000 federal crimes are already on the books. See W. John Moore, The
High Price of Good Intentions, NAT'L LJ., May 8, 1993, at 1140. By contrast, 17 crimes
made up the entire corpus of federal criminal law in 1790. See DWIGHT F. HENDERSON,
CONGRESS, CoURTS, AND CRIMNA-THE DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL COMMON LAW,
1801-29, 7 (1985).
The Constitution explicitly authorizes Congress to punish counterfeiting, piracy on the
high seas, crimes committed on federal property, and treason. See U.S. CONST. art. I §
8, cl.6, 10, 17; art. H1, § 3, cl.2.
39. See generally Brickey, supra note 15 (noting several federal laws operating at the
local level). The Access Act is a dichotomous example in that it exercises jurisdiction
over activities, which arguably are entirely intrastate, but does so to protect federal constitutional rights.
40. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3.
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grant of power must be informed by basic principles of
constitutionalism. It is axiomatic that Congress may only exercise
those powers that are enumerated in the Constitution. It would be
useless, then, to specifically define Congress' sphere of authority if
its authority was unlimited.4 Additionally, Article I contains eighteen different clauses, and this "checklist structure necessarily im-

plies a limitation on congressional authority."'4 At a minimum, the
Tenth Amendment confirms a system of limited national powers.43

It speaks directly to the notion of enumerated powers by stating
that those "powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people."' Thus, the commerce power, as is true of all other powers that the Constitution grants to
Congress, may only extend its reach to those spheres within its
ambit.45
This reach is given definition by the Necessary and Proper
Clause, which gives Congress the authority "[t]o make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution
the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department
or Officers thereof."' Chief Justice John Marshall, in McCulloch
v. Maryland,' set forth the authoritative interpretation of the
words "necessary and proper." He found that the phrase confers on
41. Indeed, in Federalist No. 45, James Madison argued that the powers of the national
government are "few and defined." Conversely, the reserved powers of the states are
"numerous and indefinite" and "will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary
course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties ... and prosperity of the State." THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 236 (James Madison).
42. Martin H. Redish & Karen L. Drizin, Constitutional Federalism and Judicial Review: The Role of Textual Analysis, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 13 (1987).
43. See Vincent A. Cirillo & Jay W. Eisenhofer, Reflections on the Congressional
Commerce Power, 60 T)EP. L.Q. 901, 903 (1987). It was clear that a stronger national
government was needed to compensate for the weaknesses of the Articles of Confederation. The difficulty arose from how best to achieve an effective national government to
promote a national economy while also protecting states' rights. Cirillo and Eisenhofer
discuss how the delegates at the Constitutional Convention debated the wisdom of an
enumerated powers approach versus an indefinite power approach to the federal government and decided on the former. See id. at 905.
44. U.S. CoNsT. amend. X.
45. This seems to state the obvious, since it is uncontroverted that congressional power
was not unlimited, and that the instrument of judicial review would police the limits. See
Kramer, supra note 11, at 1495.
46. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cI. 18.
47. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)
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Congress certain necessarily implied powers to effectuate those
powers expressly granted.' While he gave a broad reading to
"necessary and proper" so that the national government would have
the wherewithal to meaningfully effectuate its enumerated powers,
Chief Justice Marshall also affirmed the judicial department's duty
to police the limits of congressional authority. He contended that
"should Congress, under the pretext of executing its powers, pass
laws for the accomplishment of objects not intrusted to the government, it would be the painful duty of this tribunal... to say that
such an act was not the law of the land." 9
The first important construction of the Commerce Clause, Gibbons v. Ogden,0 was decided against these fundamental constitutional principles. In Gibbons, the Court considered whether a 1793
federal statute that licensed ships in "coasting trade" had preempted
a New York statute granting a 30-year monopoly to Robert
Livingston and Robert Fulton to operate steamboats between New
York and New Jersey." In ruling that the federal law had preempted the New York statute, Chief Justice Marshall broadly defined commerce as not only buying and selling, but "every species
of commercial intercourse,"52 and that the power to regulate commerce among the states "cannot stop at the external boundary line
' Howevof each State, but may be introduced into the interior."53
er, merged with the "comprehensive" nature of the word "among"
was, as Marshall argued, the notion that "it may very properly be
restricted to that commerce which concerns more States than
one."54 Thus, the words "commerce among the States" are not intended to "comprehend that commerce, which is completely internal, which is carried on between man and man in a State, or be-

48. See id. at 401-25. The need for implied powers to effectuate expressly defined
powers was especially evident following the experience under the Articles of Confederation. Chief Justice Marshall suggested that the exclusion of a clause prohibiting implied
powers, as was found in the Articles, had been purposely omitted from the Constitution to
avoid the "embarrassments" that would result from its inclusion. See id.at 406-07.
49. Id.at 423. Ultimately, the issue devolves back to the same problem that Chief
Justice Marshall faced in McCulloch. It is universally acknowledged that Congress is
limited to the powers granted to it, yet "the question respecting the extent of the powers
actually granted, is perpetually arising, and will probably continue to arise, as long as our
system shall exist." Id. at 405.
50. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
51. See id. at 190-91, 213-17.
52. Id. at 193.
53. Id. at 193-94.
54. Id.
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tween different parts of the same State, and which does not extend
or affect other States."'
Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Gibbons is well-known for
the expansive reading he gave to the Commerce Clause and his
determination that the powers under the clause are "plenary" in
nature.' Indeed, he said the commerce power, "like all others
vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its
utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are
prescribed in the [C]onstitution." s Yet intimately joined to the
concept of a plenary power under the Commerce Clause was also
the principle that it was, concurrently, "limited to specified objects."' 8 Chief Justice Marshall saw the merger of a plenary power
with the limitation of this power to what is within its sphere as not
only consistent but necessary under the constitutional framework of
enumerated powers. "The enumeration presupposes something not
enumerated; and that something, if we regard the language or the
subject of the sentence, must be the exclusively internal commerce
of a State."59 While broadly construing Congress' power under the
Commerce Clause, the Chief Justice was simultaneously careful to
clarify that the "completely internal commerce of a State" was
properly "reserved for the State itself.''" Thus, ultimately, Chief
Justice Marshall in Gibbons defined commerce power as plenary,
but plenary within its own sphere.6"
2. Post-Gibbons-The Dual Nature of the Commerce Clause
Following Gibbons, the Court did not have another opportunity
to comment further on the affirmative reach of Congress' commerce power until the late nineteenth century. However, the Court
did explore the other aspect of Gibbons-the negative side of the
Commerce Clause as a restraint on state authority in the absence of

55. See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 193-94.
56. See id. at 197.
57. Id. at 196.
58. Id. at 197.
59. Id. at 195.
60. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 195.
61. Chief Justice Marshall made it clear that the federal government would not have
authority over every sphere belonging to the states. "In America, the powers of sovereignty are divided between the government of the Union, and those of the States. They are
each sovereign, with respect to the objects committed to it and neither sovereign with
respect to the objects committed to the other." McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat) 316, 410 (1819).
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the federal exercise of power. Gibbons is universally cited as the
starting point for all discussions on the reach of congressional
power under the Commerce Clause. However, as Professor Epstein
observes, "[i]n one sense Gibbons, for all its importance, is an odd
place from which to begin [discussing the commerce power], because the case itself as much concerned the limitation of state
power as it did the extent of congressional power under the coastal
trading statute." 2 It was this negative, or dormant, side of the
Commerce Clause that restrained state legislation when that legislation burdened or discriminated against interstate commerce, even in

the absence of congressional action on the matter.63 Although the
Access Act deals with the affirmative side of the Commerce
Clause, "[tihe modem generation of negative commerce clause
cases is instructive because it proves that it is possible, and sensible, to articulate an enduring conception of interstate com-

merce-just as Chief Justice Marshall had insisted."
3. Pre-New Deal
The affirmative side of the Commerce Clause again became
relevant in the late nineteenth century when Congress began exert-

ing its regulatory powers-first in 1887, with the enactment of the
Interstate Commerce Act ("ICA"),6s and again in 1890, with the
enactment of the Sherman Antitrust Act.' During the pre-New
Deal years, the Court struggled to distinguish local commerce from

national commerce-a distinction known as "dual federalism." 7
62. Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV.
1387, 1408 (1987).
63. See Veazie v. Moor, 55 U.S. 568, 573 (1852) (upholding a state-created steamboat
monopoly because it regulated "transactions wholly internal, between citizens of the same
community"); Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 24 (1888) (upholding a state regulation prohibiting the manufacturing of intoxicating liquors because "manufacturing" was a matter
reserved for local control); see also United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1627 (1995)
(noting that under this line of cases, certain activities such as "production," "manufacturing," and "mining" were beyond congressional reach under the commerce power because
they properly fall within the province of the states).
64. Epstein, supra note 62, at 1410. Justices Kennedy and O'Connor also discussed the
dormant Commerce Clause in their concurring opinion in Lopez. They noted that "in
contrast to the prevailing skepticism that surrounds our ability to give meaning to the
explicit text of the Commerce Clause, there is widespread acceptance of our authority to
enforce the dormant Commerce Clause." Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1640 (Kennedy, J., concurring). In the same paragraph, the justices stated their "duty to recognize meaningful limits
on the commerce power of Congress." Id.
65. Ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 10101-11917
(1994)).
66. Ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-8 (1994)).
67. See Cirrillo & Eisenhofer, supra note 43, at 909-12. "Dual Federalism" has been
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When the Court reviewed the freshly exercised affirmative side of
the Commerce Clause in the late nineteenth century, it imported
the same approach that it had adopted under its negative Commerce Clause cases. As in the earlier negative Commerce Clause
cases, certain activities such as "manufacturing" were found to be
beyond congressional reach."
In United States v. E.C. Knight,69 the Court held that the
Sherman Antitrust Act could not constitutionally be applied to a
merger spearheaded by American Sugar Refining Company, a sugar
refinery that had merged with four other corporations that manufactured refined sugar."0 The Act attempted to regulate manufacturing, but the Court established that "manufacturing" does not equate
with "commerce."' It argued that "[C]ommerce succeeds to manufacture, and is not a part of it." The Court also added that the
merger "bore no direct relation to commerce between the States or
with foreign nations."
The Court in E.C. Knight was struggling to define those
spheres of activity that properly belong to the states and those
spheres of activity that belong within Congress' jurisdiction. The
Court saw it as "vital" that the commerce power was defined independently of the police power. While the former furnished "the
strongest bond of union," the latter is "essential to the preservation
of the autonomy of the States as required by our dual form of
government."7 4 What the Court's principle signified, of course,
was that certain activities, even though they may exert an influence
on interstate commerce, would nonetheless be outside the scope of
congressional authority.'

defined as follows:
1. The national government is one of enumerated powers only; 2. Also the
purposes which it may constitutionally promote are few; 3. Within their respective spheres the two centers of government are "sovereign" and hence "equal";
4. The relation of the two centers with each other is one of tension rather than

collaboration.
Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1, 4 (1950).
68. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1627.
69. 156 U.S. 1 (1894).
70. See id. at 9.
71. See id. at 12.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 17.
74. E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. at 13.
75. Such a principle is indeed consistent with the Framer's conception of the Commerce Clause. Justice Thomas explained that "[t]he Founding Fathers confirmed that most
areas of life (even many matters that would have substantial effects on commerce) would
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Not surprisingly, the Court's inquiry into the subject matter in

E.C. Knight was analytically similar to Chief Justice Marshall's
inquiry in Gibbons. In that case, Marshall considered whether navigation fell within congressional reach under the Commerce
Clause-he found it did. Conversely, however, Marshall also acknowledged that there is a point when certain activities, though
they eventually may culminate in interstate commerce, may not yet

have reached that point. Specifically, Marshall had inspection laws
in mind--the object of which "is to improve the quality of articles
produced by the labour of a country; to fit them for exportation; or

it may be, for domestic use"-and he found that such laws "act
upon the subject before it becomes an article of... commerce
among the States, and prepare it for that purpose."76
As late as 1936, the Court adhered to the distinction between
commerce and purely local activity, with the latter deemed to be
outside the scope of the Commerce Clause 7 However, this was
not the Court's exclusive approach to the Commerce Clause. In
cases dealing with the instrumentalities of commerce the Court
permitted Congress, in such cases as Houston East & West Texas
Railway Co. v. United States" (the "Shreveport Rate" case), to

regulate local activities when such activities bear such a "close and
substantial relation" to interstate commerce that their regulation is
essential to the effective regulation of commerce.79
remain outside the reach of the federal Government. Such affairs would continue to be
under the exclusive control of the states." Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1645 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas further observed that early Americans viewed commerce, manufacturing, and agriculture as strongly interdependent, yet Congress still was not given power
over all these activities. See id.
76. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 203 (1824) (emphasis added). Moreover
Marshall admitted that "inspection laws may have a remote and considerable influence on
commerce" but nevertheless "form a portion of that immense mass of legislation which
embraces every thing within the territory of a State not surrendered to the general government" Id. at 203.
77. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 304 (1936) (holding the Bituminous
Coal Conservation Act of 1935 unconstitutional because it attempted to regulate mining
production, a "purely local activity," which deals with commodities before they reach
interstate commerce); A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 543
(1935) (holding the National Industrial Recovery Act unconstitutional as attempting to
regulate activities in connection with commodities that had come to "a permanent rest"
after being in interstate commerce); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 275-76 (1918)
(holding the Child Labor Act (which forbade the shipment in interstate commerce of
goods manufactured in any plant employing child labor) unconstitutional for attempting to
regulate a matter that is purely local in character and reserved to the states under the
Tenth Amendment).
78. 234 U.S. 342 (1914)
79. See id. at 351. The Court, in permitting the Interstate Commerce Commission to
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In another line of cases the Court relied on the "current of

commerce" rationale, first articulated in Swift & Co. v. United
States," to uphold congressional action under the Commerce
Clause."' In Stafford v. Wallace,82 the Court relied on Swift to

uphold the Packers and Stockyard Act of 1921. That act provided
for the regulation of stockyards that arranged for sale and shipment
of livestock in interstate commerce. The Court held that "[tjhe

stockyards are not a place of rest or final destination" but instead
are "a throat through which the current flows, and the transactions
which occur therein are only incident to this current." 3 In so ruling, Stafford did not upset the distinction between manufacturing or
production in one sphere, and interstate commerce in the other."

These conflicting approaches toward articulating a limit on
Congress' Commerce Clause powers--direct versus indirect effects
test, manufacturing as distinguished from commerce, ancillary intrastate activities, and the current of commerce-left in place an
uneasy substructure, teetering and unstable under the weight of
growing congressional exercises of power. In retrospect, these

approaches left the constitutional landscape littered with discarded
doctrines and a hesitancy toward categorical approaches to the
Commerce Clause."

regulate wholly intrastate railroad rates, held that "[wiherever the interstate and intrastate
transactions of carriers are so related that the government of one involves the control of
the other, it is Congress, and not the state, that is entitled to prescribe the final and
dominant rule." id. at 351-52. E.C. Knight was never mentioned in the opinion.
80. 196 U.S. 375 (1905).
81. See id. at 397. The Swift Court upheld the application of antitrust laws against
price fixing by meat dealers operating exclusively intrastate. The Court argued that, unlike
in E.C. Knight "where the subject-matter of the combination was manufacture and the
direct object monopoly of manufacture within a State" and "['however likely monopoly of
commerce among the States in the article manufactured was to follow from the agreement
it was not a necessary consequence nor a primary end," in this case "the subject-matter is
sales and the very point of the combination is to restrain and monopolize commerce
among the States in respect of such sales." Id. at 397.
82. 258 U.S. 495 (1922).
83. Id. at 515-16.
84. Another way to think about it is that if the stockyards were the "throat" through
which commerce flowed, then the manufacturing in E.C. Knight or the coal mining in
Carter would be the "food on the plate" that did not yet enter into interstate commerce,
while the poultry in A.LA. Schecter would be the "stomach" where the goods in the flow
of interstate commerce had come to rest.
85. Actually, in the 1970s, the Court did attempt to fashion a new categorical approach
toward defining the limits on commerce power. However, this approach was also abandoned. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia
v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). See infra notes 110-16 and
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4. The New Deal-The Dam Breaks
These conflicting approaches, though aimed at developing a
stable Commerce Clause jurisprudence, were too weak to contain
the rush of the New Deal. During the early years of the Great
Depression the Court was still clinging to a restrictive view of
commerce power. Yet the dam holding back federal power that
Chief Justice Marshall had constructed in Gibbons broke under the

weight of a true constitutional revolution brought on by the New
Deal.s
The watershed case in the New Deal revolution was NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Co.," where the Court upheld the National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) against a Commerce Clause
challenge." The Court simultaneously departed from the direct

versus indirect effects test,89 declined to rely on the "current of
commerce" theory (saying it was merely a particular, not exclusive,
expression of commerce power),' and rejected the manufacture or
production versus commerce distinction.9 The Court adopted a
new standard, determining that intrastate activities may be regulated
by Congress "if they have such a close and substantial relation to
accompanying text.
86. The expansion of federal power was motivated by several factors, but not necessarily by textual necessity. First, outside political pressure from Roosevelt's court-packing
plan likely forced some of the Justices to at least reevaluate their view of the Commerce
Clause. See G. GUNTHER, CONsTmrIONAL LAw, 128-30 (lth ed. 1985); see also Cirillo
& Eisenhofer, supra note 43, at 912 (citing Michael E. Parrish, The Great Depression,
the New Deal, and the American Legal Order, 59 WASH. L. REv. 723, 731 (1984) (arguing that the Court shifted positions and endorsed the New Deal reform measures following
Roosevelt's landslide victory)); Robert L. Stem, The Commerce Clause and the National
Economy, 1933-1946, 59 HARV. L. REv. 645 (1946) (outlining, case by case, the expansion of the commerce power during this era). A principled approach toward construing the
Commerce Clause may thus have been adulterated by a political ideology as to the proper
relationship between the states and the federal government. Secondly, the dominant intellectual belief during the time-namely, that an active national government was the only
effective solution to pressing national problems-was influential among some of the Justices on the Court. See Epstein, supra note 62, at 1443. In this way, states' rights were
subordinated when the Court was confronted by the political exigencies of the time.
87. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
88. To support the Wagner Act's constitutionality, Congress set forth findings detailing
how labor problems lead to industrial strife or unrest that substantially burdens or affects
the flow of commerce. See id. at 23 n. 2. In the process, the congressional draftsmen in
the Wagner Act expanded the Commerce Clause lexicon by adding the term "affecting
commerc"-a term that would become prominent in the modern cases. See infra notes
89-95.
89. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 40-41.
90. See id. at 36.
91. See id. at 39.
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interstate commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to
protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions."
A slim majority of the Court was persuaded to expand the
commerce power, allowing the National Labor Relations Board
("NLRB") to regulate the labor/management relations of Jones &
Laughlin. Although the Court did acknowledge that the commerce
power "may not be extended so as to embrace effects on interstate
commerce so indirect and remote that to embrace them, in view of
our complex society, would effectively obliterate the distinction
between what is national and what is local and create a completely
centralized government,"' the Court was nevertheless shifting its
approach. It held that "congressional authority to protect interstate
commerce from burdens and obstructions is not limited to transactions which can be deemed to be an essential part of a 'flow' of
interstate or foreign commerce [since] [b]urdens and obstructions
may be due to injurious action springing from other sources. '
Moreover, "the power to regulate commerce is the power to enact
'all appropriate legislation' for 'its protection and advancement';
... That power is plenary and may be exerted to protect interstate
commerce 'no matter what the source of the dangers which threaten it."'"5 Thus, the Court adopted Marshall's notion of plenary
powers in Gibbons, but expanded the sphere in which that plenary
power could be exercised.
The later New Deal cases confirmed the near evisceration of
any substantive limits on Congress' Commerce Clause power. The
seminal case is Wickard v. Filburn," where the Court justified
congressional regulation of home-grown wheat on the basis that it
competes with wheat in interstate commerce. The Court held that
Congress could reasonably have concluded that activities, though
purely local in nature, when "taken together with that of many
others similarly situated," can exert such a substantial influence on
interstate commerce that their contribution is "far from trivial."
Thus, the "aggregation principle" significantly expanded congressio-

92. Id. at 37.
93. Id.
94. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 36.
95. I. at 36-37 (citations omitted).
96. 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (upholding the application of the Agricultural Adjustment Act
to Roscoe C. Filburn, a small farmer in Ohio who consumed most of his own wheat
crop. The Act provided the Secretary of Agriculture with the power to set quotas on
wheat production).
97. Id. at 128.
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nal power under the Commerce Clause. Congress could now regulate an entire class of activities even though an individual activity
within the class had virtually no effect on interstate commerce.

Whether the subject was production, or consumption, or marketing,
or whether it had a direct or indirect effect on interstate commerce,
was immaterial as long as it exerted a "substantial effect on interstate commerce." 8
A common thread in the New Deal cases is that all the regulations upheld were enacted for the purpose of promoting economic
growth. Following the New Deal, however, Congress invoked the
Commerce Clause for social purposes as well." First, in Heart of
Atlanta v. United States," the Court upheld the application of

Title II of the Civil Rights Act to a downtown Atlanta motel that
discriminated against blacks. Although the Act contained no congressional findings, unlike the Act in Jones & Laughlin, the Court
resorted to the congressional record to find ample evidence of the
burdens placed on interstate commerce by racial discrimination.''
Similarly, in Katzenbach v. McClung,"° the Court upheld the ap-

plication of another provision of Title II of the Civil Rights Act to
a southern restaurant engaged in discriminatory practices. The
Court concluded, despite the lack of congressional findings, that
"where we find that the legislators, in light of the facts and testimony before them, have a rational basis for finding a chosen regulatory scheme necessary to the protection of commerce, our investi-

98. Id. at 124-25; see also United States v. Wrightwood Dairy, 315 U.S. 110 (1942)
(upholding congressional authorization for Secretary of Agriculture to set minimum prices
for milk produced and consumed wholly within a single state). The final step in the
Commerce Clause transformation of the New Deal came in United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100 (1941), where the Court, in upholding the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,
rejected the Tenth Amendment as an independent limitation on commerce power by flatly
overruling Hammer v. Dagenhart and stating that the Tenth Amendment is but "a truism
that all is retained which has not been surrendered." Id. at 124.
99. This was not the first time the Court approved the use of the commerce power for
social purposes, however. An early important case approving the use of the Commerce
Clause as a national police power was Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903) (the
Lottery Case), which upheld a congressional prohibition of interstate shipment of lottery
tickets. Later cases also upheld the use of the commerce power for reasons of health,
morals, and welfare. See Hipoite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45, 60 (1911) (upholding the prohibition of the shipment of impure food and drugs); Hoke v. United
States, 227 U.S. 308, 326 (1913) (upholding the prohibition of the shipment of women
across state lines for immoral purposes).
100. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
101. See id. at 252-53.
102. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
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Finally, in Perez v. United States,'° the

Court upheld the application of anti-loansharking provisions of the
Consumer Credit Protection Act to extortionate credit transactions
that were entirely intrastate. The Court reasoned that "[w]here the
class of activities is regulated and that class is within the reach of
federal power, the courts have no power 'to excise as trivial, individual instances' of the class."105
In light of these cases, the modem Commerce Clause standard

was summarized by the Court as a combination of a rational basis
test and the requirement of some level of "effect" on interstate

commerce."°6 Once Congress concludes that an activity affects
interstate commerce, "[tihe task of a court... is relatively narrow.

The court must defer to a congressional finding that a regulated
activity affects interstate commerce, if there is any rational basis
for such a finding.""° This is a highly deferential standard, so
deferential, in fact, that in the mid-1970s the Court turned to the

103. Id. at 303-04. The Court in Katzenbach relied on the Wickard rationale and argued
that the discriminatory practices of this particular restaurant were representative of many
others throughout the country and that Congress could permissibly regulate individual
instances of a class that in the aggregate had an effect on interstate commerce. See id. at
300-01.
104. 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
105. Id. at 154 (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 193 (1968)). Although there
were ample sources on loan sharing in congressional findings and legislative history, the
sources did not address the effect of loan sharking on interstate commerce. See id. at
154-157 Congress thus did not demonstrate a systematic connection between the activities
it sought to regulate and interstate commerce. Nevertheless, the court thought it sufficient
that "[e]xtortionate credit transactions, though purely intrastate, may in the judgment of
Congress affect interstate commerce." Id. at 154. However, Justice Stewart in dissent
argued that "[ilt is not enough to say that some loan sharking has interstate characteristics, for any crime may have an interstate setting. And the circumstances that loan
sharking has an adverse impact on interstate business is not a distinguishing attribute, for
interstate business suffers from almost all criminal activity, be it shoplifting or violence in
the streets." Id. at 157-58 (Stewart, J, dissenting).
106. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276
(1981) (holding that regulations of strip mining practices fall within the commerce power).
In Hodel, the majority mentioned no requirement of a substantiality of effect on interstate
commerce-it only inquired into whether an activity "affected" interstate commerce. See
id. at 276. However, Justice Rehnquist in concurrence argued that the Commerce Clause
required Congress to demonstrate a "substantial effect' on interstate commerce. Il at 31011 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). The conflict was resolved by United States v. Lopez in
1995 in favor of the latter. An activity must have a substantial affect on interstate commerce. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630. See infra note 134 and accompanying text.
107. Hodel, 254 U.S. at 276 (citations omitted). The only other question for the Court
is whether the means chosen by Congress are "reasonably adapted to the end permitted
by the Constitution." Id. (quoting Heart of Atlanta v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 262

(1964)).
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Tenth Amendment as a vehicle to strike down Commerce Clause
regulation that unduly trammeled upon the states. First, however,
the Tenth Amendment had to be revivified following its New Deal
emasculation.
5. Resurrection of the Tenth Amendment
The use of the Tenth Amendment as a separate, substantive
limit on Congress' commerce power was effectively gutted by the
New Deal Court in United States v. Darby."es The Court declared
that the Tenth Amendment is but a "truism that all is retained
which has not been surrendered."'" In 1976, however, with the
prospect of unlimited congressional power under the Commerce
Clause, the Court breathed new life into the Tenth Amendment.
The Court, in National League of Cities v. Usery,"0 held that
Congress did not have the constitutional authority to enforce the
minimum wage and overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") against state and municipal employees because
such regulations intruded on state sovereignty. In doing so, the
Court clarified the three-prong test it had articulated in Hodel-the
"traditional governmental functions"--test for determining when
Congress has violated the Tenth Amendment. Under this test states
are exempt from congressional regulation if (1) the federal law
regulates the "States as States," (2) the federal regulation addresses
matters that are indisputedly "attribute[s] of state sovereignty," and
(3) that states' compliance with the federal law would directly
impair their ability "to structure integral operations in areas of
traditional governmental functions...' The traditional governmental functions test represented a substantive conception of federalism
because certain state activities were absolutely immune from congressional regulation under the Commerce Clause if those activities
were essential to the states functioning as states.
The traditional governmental functions test was short-lived,
however.' Although it had been applied consistently every time
108. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
109. Id. at 124.
110. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.,
469 U.S. 528 (1985).
111. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 285-88 (citing National League, 426 U.S. at 854-54). However,
even if all the elements are satisfied, the Tenth Amendment challenge to congressional
regulation under the Commerce Clause might still fail if "the nature of the federal interest
advanced [is] such that it justifies state submission:' Id.at 288 n.29; see also National
League, 426 U.S. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
112. Comparing the relation between the First and Tenth Amendment reveals that the
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it was invoked,"' the Court in 1985 in Garcia v. San Antonio -Metropolitan Transit Authority.. 4 declared the test "unworkable" and

overruled it."5 In sustaining the constitutional applicability of the
FLSA to state and local employees, the Court in Garcia declared

that "the fundamental limitation that the constitutional scheme
imposes on the Commerce Clause to protect the 'States as States'
is one of process rather than one of result.".. 6 Put differently, the
National League experiment failed because of the manner in which the argument was
framed. For example, if Congress passed a statute forbidding all newspapers espousing
Republican views from distributing their papers in interstate commerce, such an enactment
would be within the commerce power. However, the FMrst Amendment would act as a
sword to strike down the statute because, through the exercise of its powers, Congress
invaded a sphere of activity reserved to individuals under the First Amendment that is
beyond government reach. The First Amendment "would undoubtedly invalidate the law,
despite its prima facie authorization by the commerce clause." Redish & Drizin, supra
note 42, at 10.
The argument in National League failed because once the Court conceded that Congress could regulate the hours and wages of state and municipal employees through the
commerce power, see National League, 426 U.S. at 833, 836, then such a regulation
could not logically be a sphere of authority reserved to the states under the Tenth
Amendment. Since the "particular power has been given to the federal government. . . .
then that power is tautologically not reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment."
Redish & Drizin, supra note 42, at 10-11 (emphasis omitted). In this sense, the Tenth
Amendment argument in National League failed before the "traditional governmental fimctions" test was even applied. See id. at 11. The Tenth Amendment could not be construed
as a sword to strike down a federal statute if the congressional exercise of power did not
invade a sphere of authority reserved to the states. See id.
As a result, the Tenth Amendment may have more value if it is thought of as a
shield against federal power. Rather than the commerce power extending to a sphere of
state authority and being struck down by the Tenth Amendment sword, the commerce
power would not extend to that sphere in the first instance because of the Tenth Amendment shield protecting domains reserved exclusively to the states. Antithetically, a conception of the Commerce Clause that encompasses all enclaves of state authority is inconsistent with the structure of the Constitution. It leaves the Tenth Amendment devoid of
meaning. See id. at 42.
113. Not a single federal statute was struck down under the National League/Hodel
formulation. See United Transportation Union v. Long Island Railroad, 455 U.S. 678, 68890 (1982) (upholding the applicability of the Railway Labor Act's collective bargaining
provisions to a state-owned railroad); Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 770-71 (1982) (upholding provisions of the Public Utilities Regulatory
Policies Act of 1978 requiring state utilities commissioners to consider rate structuring
approaches); EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 228-29 (1983) (upholding the application
of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act to Wyoming state employees because compliance with federal law would not seriously impair a traditional governmental function).
114. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
115. Ironically, it was Justice Blackmun, who had cast the deciding vote in the 5-4
decision in National League, who joined Justices Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and White
(the four dissenting justices in National League) to overrule National League in Garcia.
Compare National League, 426 U.S. at 856, with Garcia, 469 U.S. at 530.
116. 469 U.S. at 554.
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integrity of the states in areas of local concern would be secured
through the political process rather than from substantive limits on
federal power under the Constitution.
The Garcia decision appeared to signal a complete reversal and
a nearly complete judicial abrogation in the field of demarcating
17
federal and state prerogatives under the Tenth Amendment."
However, in 1992 the Court once again revitalized the Tenth
Amendment as a potential limit on federal authority. In New York
v. United States,"' the Court struck down a portion of the LowLevel Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments of 1985. The Act
required that states arrange for the disposal, whether in-state or
out-of-state, of low-level radioactive waste generated within the
states. The Act provided a number of incentives to accomplish its
goals. One of the incentives provided that if the state had failed to
arrange for proper disposal of radioactive waste by 1993, it would
have to "take title" to the waste and be liable for all damages
directly and indirectly incurred. 9 Justice O'Connor, writing for
the majority, struck down the "take title" provision as violative of
the Tenth Amendment because it entailed that Congress "commandeer the legislative process of the States by directly compelling
them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.'. The
"take title" provision was constitutionally deficient because it represented the "choice between two unconstitutionally coercive regulatory techniques [which] is no choice at all.''
New York is significant in that it signals a departure from
Garcia which relied almost exclusively on the political process to
protect states' interests. New York shows that there are some judicial checks on congressional power. Nevertheless, it is easy to
overstate the importance of New York since, substantively, it still
permits Congress to regulate expansively as long as Congress affords states a nominal choice among alternatives-such as conditioning the receipt of federal monies on state compliance with
federal policy. Justice O'Connor's Tenth Amendment jurisprudence

117. Garcia does not represent a complete judicial abrogation in the field of federalism
since the Court will still intervene when the integrity of the political process is compromised. See Kramer, supra note 11, at 1486 n.3.
118. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
119. Id. at 175.
120. Id at 176.
121. Id.
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is, therefore, a procedural limits model rather than a substantive
limits model.
Justice O'Connor's view of federalism can perhaps be demonstrated more definitively by her opinion in Gregory v. Ashcroft.'"
O'Connor, writing for the majority, set forth a particularly demanding "clear statement" requirement. This requires that Congress must
clearly state its intention when it seeks to invade an area of state
sovereignty pursuant to the Commerce Clause.'" In Gregory, appointed Missouri State judges challenged a state mandatory retirement provision alleging it violated the federal Age Discrimination
in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"). The Court held that the
ADEA did not apply to the state's mandatory retirement provision
because Congress did not "make it clear" that the judges were
included. 24
Essentially, the clear statement requirement is a procedural
device designed to encourage a more thoughtful congressional
process, not just by "forc[ing] the objection based on the invasion
of state sovereignty onto the congressional agenda, but also...
''25 Like New York, however,
highlight[ing] it.
Gregory represents
a procedural conception of federalism, rather than a substantive
conception as in National League. This is so because Congress is
not absolutely barred from regulating any sphere of state activity
under the Tenth Amendment. Rather, Congress must merely satisfy
procedural requirements. Thus, based on the synthesis of the procedural conception of federalism under the Tenth Amendment and the
highly deferential rational basis test under the Commerce Clause,
there seemed to be virtually no judicially mandated limits on the
scope of Congress' commerce power-at least no substantive limits. Then came Lopez.
6. United States v. Lopez
In United States v. Lopez," the Court for the first time in
nearly sixty years struck down a congressional regulation under the
Commerce Clause that attempted to regulate individuals. 27 In
122. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
123. See id. at 464.
124. Id. at 467.
125. Philip P. Frickey, The Fool on the Hill: Congressional Findings, Constitutional
Adjudication, and United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. REs. L. Rrv. 695, 722 (1996)
(discussing the role that congressional processes and findings play in assessing the constitutionality of federal legislation).
126. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
127. In 1936 the Court struck down the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act. See Carter
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Lopez, the court considered the constitutionality of the Gun-Free
School Zones Act of 1990 which made it unlawful "for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual
knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone."'"
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, opened his opinion
by setting forth a basic principle inherent in our constitutional
scheme-that the Constitution creates a federal government with
enumerated powers." Oddly, however, he then went on to reaffirm the post-New Deal jurisprudence of the Court under the Commerce Clause, including such far-reaching cases as Wickard."30
Rehnquist set forth the tripartite framework defining the categories of activities that the Commerce Clause primarily reaches. First,
"Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce."'' Second, Congress has power "to regulate and protect
the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in
interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from
intrastate activities."'3 Finally, Congress has the power to regu33
late "activities that substantially affect interstate commerce."'
Rehnquist noted that the case law pertaining to the third category
was vague as to whether an activity must "affect" or "substantially
affect" interstate commerce. He resolved the vagueness, holding
that "consistent with the great weight of our case law . . . the
proper test requires an analysis of whether the regulated activity
'substantially affects' interstate commerce.' '134 Rehnquist held that
the Gun-Free School Zones Act was properly analyzed under the
35
third category.
In finding the Gun-Free School Zones Act unconstitutional,
Rehnquist relied on two primary arguments. First, he was able to
distinguish the outcome of Lopez from the framework of cases like
Wickard, Heart of Atlanta, Katzenbach, and Perez by facially dis-

v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
128. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (1994) (originally codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)C1)(A))
129. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626.
130. See id. at 1627-29.
131. Id. at 1629.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1630.
134. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630.
135. See id. The regulation under the Access Act may involve a congressional exercise
of power under this category. Cf United States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675, 687-88 (7th Cir.
1995) (stating that the Access Act could qualify under the second category-as a regulation of an instrumentality of interstate commerce-but that such a holding is "unnecessary

without further guidance from the Supreme Court").
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tinguishing them. Unlike those cases, which dealt with some form
of commercial or economic activity, Rehnquist argued the Gun-Free

Schools Zones Act was a criminal statute that had "nothing to do
with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise, however
broadly one might define those terms. 136 Thus, he was able to
cite those cases for the proposition that "[w]here economic activity
substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating that
activity will be sustained."'37 Secondly, the Chief Justice noted
that the Act "contain[ed] no jurisdictional element that would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in
'
question affects interstate commerce."138
Rehnquist also commented on the lack of any congressional
findings that would support the Act's passage. He did acknowledge, in line with precedent, that Congress is not required to make
specific findings that an activity substantially affects interstate commerce in order to legislate under the Commerce Clause. 39 Nevertheless, the existence of congressional findings would have aided
the Court in determining whether the possession of firearms in a
school zone substantially affects interstate commerce."
The Government advanced two arguments for the constitutionality of the act. The first was the "cost of crime" rationale. The
Government claimed that there are substantial costs from violent

136. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630-31.
137. Id. at 1630.
138. Id. at 1631. Rehnquist then cited United States. v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 339 (1971),
in which the Court struck down the conviction of an individual under Title VII of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (former 18 U.S.C. § 1202(a))
which made it a felony to "receive, possess, or transport in commerce or affecting commerce ...
any firearm.' The Court in Bass found an insufficient nexus between the
possession component of § 1202(a) and interstate commerce. Bass, 404 U.S. at 350. Since
it was unclear whether the statute required the possession to be in or affecting, commerce,
the Court would not adopt a broad reading of the statute absent "a clearer direction from
Congress." Id. at 339. Significantly, the Court did not reach the question of whether such
an interpretation was necessary under the Commerce Clause. See also United States v.
Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441, 452 (1953) (deciding only the question of statutory
construction of the act).
139. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631 (citing Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304
(1964) and Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 156 (1971)).
140. See id. at 1632. While the Gun-Free School Zones Act contained no congressional
findings evidencing the effect of gun possession near schools on interstate commerce,
Congress did retroactively adopt such findings after the grant of certiorari but before oral
argument in Lopez. See iL at 1632 n.4 (Pub. L. No. 103-322 § 320904, 108 Stat. 1796,
2125 (1994)). The Government did not rely on these subsequent findings as a surrogate
for the original lack of findings in the Act, but it did argue that it established a rational
basis for Congress to regulate this activity. See id.
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crime and that these costs are spread throughout society through
insurance.' The second argument was a "national productivity"
rationale. The Government claimed that interstate travel is reduced
by the presence of violent crime. Moreover, the presence of guns
in schools handicaps the learning environment, which in turn adversely affects national productivity, which in turn threatens the
country's well-being. 42 Rehnquist rejected these claims, arguing
that based on them, Congress could regulate virtually any activity
under the Commerce Clause, including marriage, divorce, and child
custody, on the theory that they affect national economic productivity. 43 Thus, he was unwilling to transform the Commerce Clause
into a "general police power of the sort retained by the States."'"
What Rehnquist and the majority were willing to do, however,
has been disputed. While the Court refused to do away with its
New Deal jurisprudence, its rhetoric suggests that the Court has set
limits on a sphere of regulatory authority which, at least prior to
Lopez, was believed to be well within congressional reach. Ultimately, Lopez may have revitalized the debate over federalism.

141. See id. at 1632.
142. See id.
143. See id. Indeed, Rehnquist criticized Justice Breyer for being "unable to identify any
activity that the States may regulate but Congress may not." Id.
144. Lopez 115 S. Ct. at 1634. Justice Thomas went further and claimed that the "substantial effects" test, "if taken to its logical extreme would give Congress a 'police power'
over all aspects of American life." IL at 1642 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas
was prepared to do away with the "substantial effects" test altogether, observing that the
Court's jurisprudence had drifted far from the original understanding of the Commerce
Clause and that the Framers believed that even many matters that had a substantial affect
on interstate commerce would nevertheless be outside the reach of the national government. See d. at 1642-44. Justice Thomas offered strong evidence that "[e]arly Americans
understood that commerce, manufacturing, and agriculture, while distinct activities, were
intimately related and dependent on each other-that each 'substantially affected' the others." Id. at 1645. Still, they were outside the federal regulatory sphere.
Four justices, however, rejected Justice Thomas' invitation to return to a construction
of the Commerce Clause that "is more faithful to the original understanding." Id. at 1642
(Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Breyer, who wrote the principal dissent, argued that the
Gun-Free School Zones Act "falls well within the scope of the commerce power as this
Court has understood that power over the last-century." Id. at 1657 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer argued that "Courts must give Congress a degree of leeway in determining the existence of a significant factual connection between the regulated activity and
interstate commerce-both because the Constitution delegates the commerce power directly
to Congress and because the determination requires an empirical judgment of a kind that
a legislature is more likely than a court to make with accuracy" Id. at 1658. Under the
rational basis test, therefore, the question before the Court "is not whether the 'regulated
activity sufficiently affected interstate commerce,' but, rather, whether Congress could have
had 'a rational basis' for so concluding." Id. at 1629.
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However, the Court's decision contains two widely divergent conceptions of federalism that now compete for the true meaning of
Lopez. The two conceptions parallel the procedural and substantive
approaches to the Tenth Amendment. It is the purpose of the next
section to provide a framework through which to analyze the constitutionality of the Access Act by articulating in detail these two
distinct conceptions of federalism.
II. A DETAILED ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF THE ACCESS

ACr UNDER THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
A. Two Guiding Conceptions of Lopez
1. The Procedural Conception of Federalism
The first conception of federalism coming out of Lopez is
based on a procedural constraint model, similar to Congress' power
vis-a-vis the Tenth Amendment in cases like Gregory and New
York. It is a procedural constraint model because Congress must
merely satisfy particular procedural requirements before passing
legislation. 4 Under the procedural conception of federalism, the
Commerce Clause would not be limited to any particular sphere of
activity. Congress would have free rein to regulate any human
activity on the assumption that all activities affect interstate commerce in our modem, highly integrated economy. The only real
limits would be in the form of requirements pertaining to legislative findings, clear statements, or nexus requirements. Thus, Congress could still criminalize the possession of guns near schools if
it includes a jurisdictional element demonstrating a nexus of the
firearm to interstate commerce."4 For example, if the gun had
once traveled across state lines, that would provide a basis for

145. See discussion supra notes 119-25.
146. See H. Jefferson Powell, Enumerated Means and Unlimited Ends, 94 MICH. L.
REv. 651, 651-52 (1995) (arguing that "as a practical matter, the main effect of Lopez is
very likely to be nothing more than a renewed congressional interest in loading federal
criminal statutes with findings and 'jurisdictional element[s]'") (footnote omitted). Under
the procedural conception, if Congress passed the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1996
and included a jurisdictional element establishing a nexus between the gun and interstate
commerce, the Court might find it constitutional. See Stephen M. MeJohn, The Impact of
United States v. Lopez: The New Hybrid Commerce Clause, 34 DUQ. L. REv. 1, 34-35
(1995) In fact, the bill for a new Gun-Free School Zones Act was recently introduced by
Senator Kohl. It is expected to remedy the procedural shortcomings of the 1990 statute.
See S. 890, 104th Cong. (1995).
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Congress to regulate.147 Alternatively, Congress could adopt findings that detail the substantial effect that guns near schools have

on interstate commerce.14 The point of the procedural conception
of Lopez, ultimately, is to encourage Congress to deliberate more
fully on the wisdom of statutes that alter the balance of federal-

ism. 49 It is not intended to reserve any sphere of activity exclusively for the states.

The procedural conception of federalism in Lopez is drawn
from both the language of the decision itself as well as from coinciding events that "may portend more stability in Commerce Clause
jurisprudence than some Court watchers initially predicted.' '..
First, as noted, the Court reaffirmed its New Deal cases.' In do-

147. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 350 (1971) (noting that government
meets its burden if it can prove that the firearm has travelled in interstate commerce). If
the lack of a jurisdictional element was the determinative factor, however, then it would
seem to be unnecessary for the Court in Lopez to state that gun possession in a school
zone has nothing to do with commerce or any economic enterprise. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct.
at 1631-33. The prudent approach would have been to write a narrow opinion. Perhaps,
as Professor Brickey suggests, the Court wanted to provide "a reminder that the Court's
policy of deferring to congressional judgments is not a presumption of congressional infallibility." Brickey, supra note 15, at 843.
148. Though the majority in Lopez noted that Congress "is not [normally] required to
make formal findings as to the substantial burdens that an activity has on interstate commerce," Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631, it said that "findings would enable [it] to evaluate the
legislative judgment that the activity in question substantially affected interstate commerce,
even though no such substantial effect was visible to the naked eye." Id. at 1632. Indeed,
Congress may well conclude that gun possession near a school is related to commerce. If
the Court wanted to declare that Congress did not have a rational basis for its conclusion,
it would have to overrule a major part of its modem Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
The Court in Lopez said that the Gun-Free School Zones Act had nothing to do with
commerce or an economic enterprise. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630-31. However, the
possession of guns in a school zone can clearly have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce. "Gun possession in schools can affect education, which undoubtedly has economic effects on salaries and productivity, and can affect the market for guns and whether they flow from state to state." McJohn, supra note 146, at 28 n.21 1. In fact, guns
near schools that disrupt the learning environment can have even greater commercial ramifications than anti-abortion activities under the Access Act. While the latter could harm
the commercial health of reproductive clinics across the country, the former could have a
deleterious effect on the entire economy.
149. See McJohn, supra note 146, at 39 (arguing that "Lopez may ultimately amount to
a rule encouraging a measure of deliberation in the political process without hobbling
Congress'). Professor MeJohn suggests that "the principal effect of Lopez is that of a
clear statement rule." Id. at 38. It essentially means that "[if Congress intends to take
action pursuant to the commerce power which interferes with the way a state exercises its
sovereign powers, then Congress must take pains to be very clear about it." Id. at 22-23.
Practically speaking, however, it means no real substantive constraint on Congress.
150. Brickey, supra note 15, at 833.
151. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630.
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ing so, the Court may have conceded that the political process can
adequately safeguard the balance between the federal government
and the states. The New Deal jurisprudence implicitly captures this
notion. Under cases like Wickard, for example, the commerce

power is defined so broadly that it subsumes virtually all activities
otherwise belonging to the states.'52 Thus, even though the Court
continues to hold that there are indeed judicial limits to the commerce power,' the New Deal construction of the Commerce
Clause is so broad that the Court may have implicitly adopted the
philosophy of Garcia. The philosophy holds that congressional selfrestraint is the primary limit on the Commerce Clause. 54
Second, Lopez was only one of two Commerce Clause cases
decided during the Court's term. One week after Lopez, in a per
curiam opinion, the Court decided United States v. Robertson.'55
The Court reversed a Ninth Circuit decision, overturning a conviction in connection with an alleged RICO enterprise on the ground
that there was insufficient evidence that the enterprise was engaged
in or affected commerce. 6 Some commentators suggested that
Robertson sends "a clear message that Lopez was no blockbuster."'5 7 More telling, however, may be the Court's denial of certiorari"' in four other cases dealing with interstate commerce. 9

152. See Kramer, supra note 11, at 1487.
153. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1628-29.
154. Actually, even under Garcia, the Court would intervene when the integrity of the
political process was compromised. See Kramer, supra note 11, at 1486, n.3. Nevertheless,
the general tenor of Garcia reflects an inherent trust in Congress to properly draw the
lines of federalism.
155. 115 S. Ct 1732 (1995).
156. United States v. Robertson, 15 F.3d 862, 868 (9th Cir. 1994). The alleged RICO
enterprise in Robertson was a gold mine located in Alaska. Virtually all of the gold obtained from the mine was sold inside the state. See id. The Ninth Circuit found that the
interstate commerce nexus was not satisfied because the local activity of the mine had
merely "an incidental effece' on interstate commerce. See id. The Supreme Court overruled the Ninth Circuit without even mentioning Lopez. Robertson, 115 S. Ct. at 1733.
The Court held that the Ninth Circuit's inquiry into the question of whether the gold
mine activities "affected" interstate commerce was unnecessary because the "affecting
commerce" analysis was only applicable to questions "of Congress' power over purely
intrastate commercial activities that nonetheless have substantial interstate effects." Id The
Court cited Wickard for this proposition with no mention of Lopez.
157. W. John Moore, A Landnark Decision? Maybe Not, 27 NAT'L LJ. 1131 (1995).
158. Some caution is appropriate before attributing too much weight to denials of certiorari since the Court has stated that no inference is to be drawn from such denials. See
Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, 409 U.S. 363, 366 n.1 (1973) (citing Maryland
v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 919 (1950)). On the other hand, there is also
evidence that denials of certiorari do have significance. See Deborah Jones Merritt, Corn-
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The Fourth Circuit's decision in United States v. Ramey,'"° for
example, offered a particularly attractive opportunity for the Court
to build on Lopez.
Ramey involved the conviction of two individuals for the arson
of a building in an activity affecting commerce under Title XI of
the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970.2 The two had burned

down a mobile home occupied by an interracial couple. 62 Rejecting the defendants' Commerce Clause challenge, the Fourth Circuit
found that the mobile home had received electricity from an interstate commerce power grid. The court reasoned that although "the
trailer doubtless consumed but a pittance of energy from the power

company's grid, its consumption, combined with that of all similar-

merce!, 94 MicH. L. REv. 674, 735-76 n.278-79 (1995).
159. First, the Court denied certiorari petitions in two cases where lower courts had
upheld the Anti-Car Theft Act of 1992, 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1994), against Commerce
Clause challenges. See Overstreet v. United States, 40 F.3d 1090, 1092-93 (10th Cir.
1994) (holding that caijacking statute came within Congress' power under the commerce
clause), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1970 (1995); United States v. Osteen, 30 F.3d 135 (6th
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1825 (1995). Under the Anti-Car Theft Act, a person
is guilty of carjacking if he or she "takes a motor vehicle that has been transported,
shipped, or received in interstate or foreign commerce from the person or presence of
another by force and violence or by intimidation, or attempts to do so [while in the
possession of a firearm]." 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1994). The issues raised by the carijacking
statute gave the Court the opportunity to comment on the significance, if any, of Lopez.
For example, if an automobile that had been shipped in interstate commerce 50 years ago
and had since come to a rest could be reached by the statute, then Congress could federalize countless other local crimes. Similarly, the robbery of a local convenience store
could be made a federal crime since most of the merchant's goods for sale came from
out-of-state. See United States v. Cortner, 834 F. Supp. 242, 243 (M.D. Tenn. 1993),
rev'd sub nom. United States v. Osteen, 30 F.3d 135 (6th Cir. 1994).
The Court also denied certiorari petitions in two cases upholding a federal statute
making arson of a building used in an activity affecting commerce a federal crime. 18
U.S.C. § 884(i) (1994) (stating that one who maliciously damages or destroys property
used in interstate commerce shall be imprisoned not more than 20 years). See United
States v. Ramey, 24 F.3d 602, 607 (4th Cir. 1994) (noting that defendants were convicted
of arson of a building used in activity affecting interstate commerce), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 1838 (1995); United States v. Moore, 25 F.3d 1042 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 1838 (1995). Justice Scalia, however, did write that in both cases he would have
granted the petitions, vacated the judgments, and remanded the cases back to the Fourth
Circuit "for further consideration in light of [Lopez]." Ramey, 115 S. Ct. 1838; Moore,
115 S. Ct. 1838.
160. 24 F.3d 602 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1838 (1995).
161. 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (1994) (setting forth maximum penalties for malicious damage
by fire or explosives to any real or personal property in violation of the act).
162. See Ramey, 24 F.3d at 604. The testimony at trial revealed that the two defendants
made derogatory statements about blacks and expressed hatred of the mobile home occupants, indicating that they acted out of personal hatred rather than any economic motive.
See id. at 605.
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ly situated buildings, has a most definite effect on interstate commerce."'" For the Fourth Circuit, this meager connection to commerce satisfied that criminal statute's requirement of the "use" in
an activity that "affects" commerce.'
The Fourth Circuit
summed up its view of modem Commerce Clause jurisprudence by

arguing that "[als a practical matter, at least since the watershed
decisions of 1937-1942, the political process, and not the courts,
has been the States' only real defense against commerce-based
federal incursions.""

163. Id. at 607. In Russell v. United States, 471 U.S. 858, 862 (1985), the Supreme
Court speculated that Congress' constitutional authority under § 844(i) might not protect
"every private home." However, the Court did hold that Congress had intended to use its
full power under the Commerce Clause "to protect all business property." Id. The Fourth
Circuit, however, suggested that Russell implicitly rejected the rationale that § 844(i) did
not apply to merely commercial property and argued that Congress' commerce power
reaches farther. See Ramey, 24 F.3d at 607. Specifically, the Fourth Circuit in Ramey
dismissed the Second Circuit's reasoning in United States v. Mennuti, 639 F.2d 107 (2nd.
Cir. 1981) that § 844(i) applied only to property used for a commercial purpose. See
Ramey, 24 F.3d at 607. It favorably cited the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Stillwell,
900 F.2d 1104 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 838 (1990), which held that the receipt
of natural gas that had moved in interstate commerce was a sufficient basis to sustain
Congress' jurisdiction over the activity. See Ramey, 24 F.3d at 607.
164. See Ramey, 24 F.3d at 607 n.7. The Court also considered an alternative rationale-that the mobile home had been manufactured in North Carolina before it came to
rest in West Virginia where it was burned-but it ultimately opted to ground the disposition of the case on the other rationale. See id. at 607.
165. Id. at 606 (footnotes omitted). To support its claim, the Fourth Circuit cited Chief
Justice Marshall:
The wisdom and the discretion of Congress, their identity with the people, and
the influence which their constituents possess at elections, are, in this, as in
many other instances, as that, for example, of declaring war, the sole restraints
on which they have relied, to secure them from . . . abuse. They are the restraints on which the people must often rely solely, in all representative governments.
l at 606 n. 5. Chief Justice Marshall said this, however, in the context of a discussion
of powers that Congress had already possessed-such as the power to declare war. Clearly, the "sole restraint" on a declaration of war would necessarily have to be with the
wisdom of Congress since citizens could not rely on the judiciary to restrain Congress
from legitimately exercising a power enumerated specifically in Article I. By contrast,
Marshall might dispute that citizens would be required to rely solely on congressional
restraint if Congress tried to declare war without the necessary two-thirds vote of both
houses. See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.11. Similarly, with the commerce power, Marshall would likely dispute that the wisdom and discretion of Congress would be
the sole restraints since in the sentence immediately preceding the quote used by the
Fourth Circuit in Ramey, Marshall discussed how Congress's power, though plenary, is
"limited to specified objects." Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824).
Marshall's language seems to repudiate the notion that the Court should abdicate oversight
of Congress while it is exercising its power within its limited sphere.
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The Ramey decision was an appealing case, based on its facts
and reasoning, for the Supreme Court to further develop its Commerce Clause jurisprudence following Lopez. Clearly, the Fourth
Circuit places great reliance on the political process-the touch-

stone of the procedural conception of Lopez-as a limit on
Congress' commerce power. And political process approach to

federalism is not without its adherents. Theorists like Herbert
Weschler'" and Jesse H. Choper 67 have proposed that the safeguards of the political process can more properly allocate power
between the federal and state governments under the Commerce
Clause.s Choper, for example, identifies several "structural as-

pects of the national political system [that] serve to assure that
states' rights will not be trampled.""6
The political process argument, however, has serious shortcomings"'7 -shortcomings that are exacerbated by the fact that Congress is motivated by irresistible political pressures to look "tough
on crime... 7' The politics of crime make it highly unlikely that

166. HERBERT WESCHLER, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, in PRINCIPLEs, POLTICS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAw 49 (1961).
167. JESSE H. CHoPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLmCAL PROCESS: A
FUNCmIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SuPREME COURT (1980).
168. See also Mark Tushet, Why the Supreme Court Overruled National League of
Cities, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1623 (1994); WECIISLER, supra note 166.
169. CHOPER, supra note 167, at 176. Weschler stresses similar themes. See WECHsLER,
supra note 166, at 54. The political safeguards include such structnral features as how
congressional representation is allotted by states, how states have authority to draw district
lines, how states have the right to determine qualifications to vote, and how each state is
equally represented in the Senate which selected its members, at least before the adoption
of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913, through state legislatures. See CHOPER, supra note
167, at 176-81. Similarly, the Court in Garcia observed that "the composition of the
Federal Government was designed in large part to protect the States from overreaching by
Congress." Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550-51
(1985) (footnote omitted).
170. Several commentators, for example, have expressed doubts about the political process as a safeguard against federal power. See, e.g., William W. Van Alstyne, The Second
Death of Federalism, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1709 (1985); A.E. Dick Howard, Garcia and the
Values of Federalism: On the Need for a Recurrence to Fundamental Principles, 19 GA.
L. REV. 789 (1985); Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy:
Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 15-22 (1988); Martin H. Redish,
Federalism, the Constitution, and American Political Theory, in TiE CONSTIrUTION AS
PoLmCAL STRUCTURE ch. 23 (1995).
171. The district court in United States v. Omelas, 841 F. Supp. 1087, 1093 (D. Colo.
1994), rev'd mem., 56 F.3d 78 (10th Cir. 1995), made this observation about the need to
look tough on crime. It also argued that "the Garcia Court's confidence in the political
process to deter the zeal of Congress to centralize prosecutorial power may have been too
optimistic." Id; see also Merritt, supra note 158, at 707-09 (arguing that the pressure to
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Congress will be a model of self-restraint. This only serves to
underscore the shortcomings of the procedural conception of Lopez.
As Justice Kennedy noted in Lopez, the balance between the federal and state governments is easily tipped in favor of the former as
a result of momentary political convenience."T Thus, despite the
added measure of congressional deliberation before a statute is
passed, congressional self-restraint is nevertheless hard to come by.
This is especially so when, as Professor William P. Marshall accurately observes, "virtually every constituency supports federalization
when it is consistent with their own substantive agenda. ' "
Most importantly, however, the political process approach to
federalism is inconsistent with the constitutional structure. The
Framers understood that the political process would afford states
some measure of protection against an overreaching federal government. 74 Despite that understanding, the Framers added additional
protection through a system of enumerated powers.7" Thus, it
seems to pervert the constitutional framework if the Court can
decide which constitutional values it will enforce and which values
' The
it will relegate to the "Darwinism of the political process." 76
Court's refusal to upset the Fourth Circuit's view in Ramey is
disappointing because "without some substantive limitation on

look tough on crime drives Congress to pass new federal criminal laws even though they
duplicate existing state laws); Brickey, supra note 15, at 839 (arguing that much of the
current federalization of criminal law duplicates or overlaps state crimes).
172. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1639 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy argued
that "the federal balance is too essential a part of our constitutional structure and plays
too vital a role in securing freedom for us to admit inability to intervene when one or
the other level of Government has tipped the scales too far." Id.
173. William P. Marshall, Federalization:A Critical Overview, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 719,
722 (1995) (citing the abortion debate as an example where, even if Roe v. Wade were
overturned, both sides have indicated that the struggle would be waged in Congress, rather
than in state legislatures).
174. See supra note 165.
175. See Redish & Drizin, supra note 42, at 39. Redish and Drizin argue that
Had the framers been confident that the political process, standing alone, would
provide sufficient protection to state interests, presumably they would have
expressly vested in the federal government carte blanche to do what it deemed
advisable. They clearly did not do so, and the states themselves, unwilling to
rely solely on the enumeration structure of article I, insisted on insertion of the
even more explicit tenth amendment as a condition for ratification. Rather than
supporting Dean Choper's position, evidence of the framers' understanding of
ways in which the political process protects federalism actually undermines his
conclusion.
Id. (footnote omitted).
176. See id. at 12.
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congressional power, federalism becomes nothing more than an
unenforceable promise of congressional self-restraint."'" Fortunately, it is plausible that Lopez embodies a second conception of
federalism-a substantive conception.
2. The Substantive Conception of Federalism
Briefly, and to be explored in more depth later,'78 the substantive conception of federalism in Lopez is drawn from the
Court's rhetoric which "clearly envisions substantive limits on the
federal government's power to legislate on local matters."'79 Under the substantive conception of federalism, Congress' power
under the Commerce Clause would be limited strictly to commercial activities. The Court would have to make "a determination
whether an intrastate activity is commercial or noncommercial."'' 0
Congress would still determine whether an activity "substantially
affects" interstate commerce, as a question of fact, but the Court
would determine whether an activity is a "commercial activity"
subject to the commerce power, as a question of law.
Concededly, the majority in Lopez never explicitly held that the
regulated activity must be of a commercial nature before it may be
regulated by Congress. However, the Court did draw the distinction
between commercial and noncommercial activities several times' 8'

177. Anne C. Dailey, Federalism and Families, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1787, 1818 (1995).
178. See infra Part Ill.
179. McJohn, supra note 146, at 3.
180. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1633. It is unclear whether the decision in Lopez actually
turned on the distinction between commercial and noncommercial activities or on the
absence of congressional findings or the lack of a jurisdictional element Yet the dissent
in Lopez sensed the majority's distinction between commercial and noncommercial activities and argued that it is one of "hopeless porosity" and that it "looks much like the old
distinction between what directly affects commerce and what touches it only indirectly."
Id. at 1654 (Souter, J.,dissenting). However, the commercial versus noncommercial distinction is qualitatively different from the direct/indirect test of E.C. Knight alluded to by
the dissent. The latter standard was a test of degree that required a court to make an
empirical judgment as to the level of effect an activity needed to have on interstate commerce before Congress could regulate. By contrast, the commercial activity standard is
categorical in approach-more akin to the "integral governmental functions" test in National League--because it requires courts to evaluate the nature of an activity to determine if
it can properly be deemed "commercial." Yet unlike the National League standard, the
distinction between commercial and noncommercial activities is far more judicially manageable. See infra Part IlL The commercial versus noncommercial distinction is actually
closer to the "manufacturing versus commerce" standard in E.C. Knight.
181. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1633 ("We do not doubt that Congress has authority
under the Commerce Clause to regulate numerous commercial activities that substantially
affect interstate commerce and also affect the educational process.") (emphasis added); id.
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and relied on this distinction when it argued that gun possession

has "nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise."'' Thus, it is possible that the Court in Lopez was articulating a substantive conception of federalism as a categorical limit
on Congress' authority. 3 Ultimately, however, while it is still a
matter of contention whether the Court was truly articulating a
commercial activities requirement, it is in this framework (procedural versus substantive conception of federalism) that the constitutionality of the Access Act must be analyzed.
B. The Constitutionality of the Access Act within
the Federalism Framework
1. Introduction: Cases Before and After Lopez
Only two courts have held that the Access Act is unconstitutional."' Five lower courts have upheld the Access Act under the
Commerce Clause, but these cases were decided before the Court's
decision in Lopez'8s Five other courts, however, have sustained
the Access Act against Commerce Clause challenges in light of
Lopez."' In the next three sections, this Note analyzes and critiques the reasoning that different courts have engaged in to deter("Admittedly, a determination whether an interstate activity is commercial or noncommercial may in some cases result in legal uncertainty.") (emphasis added); id. at 1638 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[Wiere the Federal Government to take over the regulation of
entire areas of traditional state concern, areas having nothing to do with the regulation of
commercial activities, the boundaries between the spheres of federal and state authority
would blur and political responsibility would become illusory.") (emphasis added); id. at
1640 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("As the Chief Justice explains, unlike the earlier cases to
come before the Court here neither the actors nor their conduct have a commercial character, and neither the purposes nor the design of the statute have an evident commercial
nexus.") (emphasis added).
182. Id. at 1630-31.
183. But cf McJohn, supra note 146, at 3-4 (arguing that while the rhetoric of Lopez
suggests substantive limits on Congress, "its effect is likely to be more consistent with
the procedural conception of federalism").
184. See Hoffman v. Hunt, 923 F. Supp. 791 (W.D.N.C. 1996); United States v. Wilson, 880 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Wis.), rev'd, 73 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 1995).
185. See American Life League, Inc. v. United States, 855 F. Supp. 137 (E.D. Va.
1994), affd 47 F.3d 642 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 55 (1995); Riely v. Reno,
860 F. Supp. 693 (D. Ariz. 1994); United States v. Hill, 893 F. Supp. 1034 (N.D. Fla.
1994); Cook v. Reno, 859 F. Supp. 1008 (W.D. La. 1994); Council for Life Coalition v.
Reno, 856 F. Supp. 1422 (S.D. Cal. 1994).
186. See United States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 1995); Cheffner v. Reno, 55
F.3d 1517 (11th Cir. 1995); United States v. Scott, 919 F. Supp. 76 (D. Conn. 1996);
United States v. Lucero, 895 F. Supp. 1421 (D. Kan. 1995); United States v. White, 893
F. Supp. 1423 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
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mine if the Access Act is a constitutional exercise of the commerce power and explains how such reasoning corresponds to the
two conceptions of federalism drawn from Lopez. The analysis is
conducted on three lines: (1) pre-Lopez cases which have upheld
the Access Act; (2) a sole pre-Lopez case that invalidated the Access Act; and (3) the post-Lopez treatment of the Access Act.
2. Pre-Lopez Analysis
a. Riely v. Reno-A Representative Case
Riely v. Reno' is representative of the analysis that preLopez courts engaged in to uphold the Access Act. In some respects, Riely and Lopez are similar. However, Lopez alters the
Commerce Clause analysis found in Riely in a significant manner.
To understand Riely, it is important to note that while Riely was
decided before the Supreme Court's decision in Lopez, it was decided after the Fifth Circuit's Lopez decision.'88 The Fifth Circuit
in Lopez had argued that "[n]either the act itself nor its legislative
history reflect any Congressional determination that the possession
denounced by 922(q) is in any way related to interstate commerce
or its regulation, or, indeed, that Congress was exercising its power
under the Commerce Clause."'" 9 The Fifth Circuit found it determinative that Congress did not make adequate findings, but left it
open as to whether Congress might be able to support the regulation in the future if it did make such findings." ° Thus, the Fifth
Circuit relied on the procedural conception of federalism and held
that Congress failed to meet the minimal findings requirement.
The Riely court distinguished the Fifth Circuit Lopez decision
by arguing that, with the Access Act, Congress had not only declared that it was exercising its power pursuant to the Commerce
Clause but it had also made "findings that the activities proscribed
by [the Access Act] affect interstate commerce.'' 9 However, the
187. 860 F. Supp. 693 (D. Ariz. 1994).
188. 2 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1993), aff d, United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624

(1995).
189. Id. at 1366. The Fifth Circuit affirmed that there are constitutional limits on commerce power and that Congress may not use a "trivial impact" on intrastate commerce as
a justification for regulating local activities since "the chain of causation is virtually indefinite, and hence there is no private activity, no matter how local and insignificant, the
ripple effect from which is not in some theoretical measure ultimately felt beyond the

borders of the state in which it took place." Id. at 1362.
190. See id. at 1368.
191. Riely, 860 F. Supp. at 707. The inclusion of both a declaration and findings direct-
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district court in Riely went further and argued that Congress is not

even required to make express findings to show that an activity
affects interstate commerce."9 In this respect, Riely's reasoning
corresponds more with the Supreme Court in Lopez where the

Court argued that Congress "normally" need not make particularized fmdings.'"
Still, there are several differences between Riely and the Supreme Court's decision in Lopez-both procedural and substantive
differences. First, unlike Riely, the Court in Lopez did not consider
it sufficient that a rational relationship existed between firearm possession near schools and interstate commerce. This is conspicuous
given that Justice Breyer, in dissent, provided considerable evidentiary support for an empirical link between the possession of a
firearm in a school zone and its deleterious effect on interstate
commerce.' Under the Court's prior cases, the Gun-Free School
Zones Act should have survived rational review, as the dissenters
pointed out.195 Thus, it is possible that the Court in Lopez was
ly distinguishes the Riely court's Access Act analysis from the Fifth Circuit's Gun-Free
School Zones Act analysis. The Fifth Circuit found that there was not merely a lack of a
declaration and findings, formal or informal, but the legislative history itself did not show
that Congress was invoking the Commerce Clause. See Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1363-64. On the
other hand, as the Fifth Circuit itself acknowledged, Congress need not recite what power
it decides to exercise in order to support a regulation's constitutionality. See id.; see also
Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 144 (1948).
192. See Riely, 860 F. Supp. at 707 (citing United States v. Edwards, 13 F.3d 291, 293
(9th Cir. 1993)).
193. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631 (citing Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304
(1964); United States v. Perez, 402 U.S. 146, 156 (1971)).
194. See ld.at 1665-70 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer's accumulated findings
show that the Court could articulate a conclusion for Congress that guns near schools
affect interstate commerce and that Congress "could have had 'a rational basis' for so
concluding" Id. at 1658 (emphasis omitted). Interestingly, however, if Justice Breyer
thought that it was sufficient if Congress could have had a rational basis for its conclusion, then it was unnecessary for him to add an appendix several pages long, containing
an avalanche of information taken from several journals, magazines, and congressional
reports, substantiating that conclusion. He could have just presumed that, in the judgment
of Congress, there was a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
195. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1651 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 1652 (Souter, J.,
dissenting); ld.at 1657 (Breyer, J.,dissenting). As such, it is possible to conjecture that
the Court was moving toward heightened procedural requirements for Congress--perhaps
signaling a "toughened rational review" in Commerce Clause cases. Professor Deborah
Jones Merritt, for example, suggests that from the general tenor of the majority opinion in
Lopez, taken together with the statements of the O'Connor and Kennedy concurrence, the
Court will scrutinize Commerce Clause challenges under a "toughened" rational basis
standard, or a rational basis with "bite." See Merritt, supra note 158, at 684. Even Justice
Souter in dissent stressed that the level of deference suggested by the majority would be
subject to "gradation according to the commercial or noncommercial nature of the immedi-
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signalling that Congress needs to satisfy the requirement of legislative findings before it can regulate certain activities where the
connection to interstate commerce is not immediately apparent.

Indeed, while Rehnquist argued that findings are not normally
needed," he did add that "to the extent that congressional findings would enable us to evaluate the legislative judgment that the
activity in question substantially affected interstate commerce, even

though no such substantial effect was visible to the naked eye,
they are lacking here.""1 This would thus accord with the procedural conception of federalism and would account for differences
between Riely and Lopez.
Secondly, and alternatively, the difference between Riely and

Lopez may turn on a substantive feature-that is, on the standard
each employed. Unlike the court in Riely, which held that a court
must defer if a "regulated activity affects interstate commerce,' '..
the Supreme Court held that a court must defer if a regulated
activity "substantially affects" interstate commerce."9 In fact,
Rehnquist in Lopez went out of his way to emphasize that the
"substantial effects" test is the proper standard to apply in Commerce Clause cases," suggesting that the Court considers there
to be a legally significant difference between the two standards.
Thus, one is tempted to say that under Lopez, if an activity does

ate subject of the challenged regulation." Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1653 (Souter, J., dissenting). On the other hand, if the Court were applying a toughened rational review in Lopez,
it did not announce its new standard explicitly. If the Court did, indeed, give less deference to Congress in Lopez, its approach then was more similar to the approach taken in
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985), where the Court purported
to apply rational review but instead substituted a "second-order rationality inquiry." See
Frickey, supra note 125, at 728.
196. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631.
197. Id. at 1632 (footnote omitted). Actually, Chief Justice Rehnquist's Lopez opinion
may be consistent with his earlier statement that "simply because Congress may conclude
that a particular activity substantially affects interstate commerce does not necessarily
make it so." Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 311
(1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). However, as the Fifth Circuit in Lopez observed about
the rational basis test, no Supreme Court in the last 50 years has set aside findings of
Congress, formal or informal, claiming that a regulated activity substantially affects interstate commerce. See Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1363 n.43. This is not surprising given the extreme
deference that courts give to Congress under rational basis review. At the same time,
however, "the Court has never renounced responsibility to invalidate legislation as beyond
the scope of the Commerce Clause." Id.
198. Riely v. Reno, 860 F. Supp. 693, 707 (D. Ariz. 1994) (citing Hodel, 452 U.S. at
276) (emphasis added).
199. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630 (emphasis added).
200. See id.at 1630.

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:553

not substantially affect interstate commerce, Congress is barred
from regulating it. This would hold true, however, if it were not
for the aggregation principle." As the next section explains, the
substantial effects standard may, unfortunately, be no more than a
mere linguistic formula-one with a closer relation to the procedural conception of federalism than to the substantive conception. If
this is true, then the difference between Riely and Lopez may be a
difference in degree rather than a difference in kind.
b. Aggregation-Transforming Substantive
Constraint into Procedural Formality
The difference between the mere "affects" formulation and the
"substantial effect" standard may be legally cognizable, as Lopez
seems to suggest, but the difference becomes chimerical in practice.
This is implied by the Fifth Circuit's observation in Lopez "that
the imprecise and matter of degree nature of concepts such as
'substantially,' especially as applied to effect on interstate commerce, generally renders decision making in this area peculiarly
within the province of Congress, rather than the Courts."' The
operation of the aggregation principle, however, virtually stultifies
the purported difference and renders limits under the Commerce
Clause illusory.
As noted, Congress marshaled extensive findings to support the
Access Act.' It is very likely that these findings satisfy the "substantial effect" test from Lopez. However, if Congress were only
able to muster a single trivial finding to support the Access Act,
then theoretically, Congress would not have satisfied the substantial

201. See supra notes 96-98.
202. United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1362 (5th Cir. 1993), affid, United States v.
Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
203. For example, the court in Riely recited extensive findings made by the Committee
on Labor and Human Resources dealing with how clinics and abortion services providers
are directly and indirectly involved in interstate commerce and operate within the stream
of commerce since they often purchase medical products from other states. See Riely, 860
F. Supp. at 707 (reciting congressional findings in S. REP No. 103-117, at 31 (1993)).
The court also noted that the Committee found that such abortion providers employ staff
and lease office space, that many patients engage in interstate travel in order to obtain
abortion services in different states, and that clinic employees occasionally travel across
state lines to work. See id.Finally, the court noted that the Committee found that the
obstructionist activities targeted by the Access Act have a "negative effece' on interstate
commerce. See id. Blockades and sabotage had forced clinics to close and no longer
provide services, which in turn led to a decrease in the interstate movement of people
and goods. See id.
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effects test.' For example, Congress should not be able to use
the fact that clinic employees "occasionally" travel across state
lines as an excuse to regulate local acts of civil disobedience by
anti-abortion protesters. The Court has declared that Congress may
not rely on "a relatively trivial impact on commerce as an excuse
for broad general regulation of state or private activities." Unfortunately, while the effect of the local farmer's activities in
Wickard was also relatively "trivial," the regulation was upheld
because the Court, under the aggregation principle, presumed that
the effect of such trivial activity taken together with other similar
activity makes it much less trivial.'
The aggregation principle, in fact, has a dual nature. In addition to aggregating a significant number of actors who individually
engage in a low volume of activity, as in Wickard, Congress can,
conversely, aggregate a smaller number of actors who individually
engage in a high volume of activity, as in Perez. Thus, for example, Congress justified the need for the passage of the Access Act

204. After all, if the substantial effects test is supposed to represent the limit on
Congress' commerce power, then by necessary implication there must be some activities
that have an insubstantial effect on interstate commerce. The Seventh Circuit in United
States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675,682 (7th Cir. 1995), for example, argued that "[a] mere
decrease in the sale or purchase of goods or services would not qualify" as a substantial
effect on interstate commerce. The Seventh Circuit cited this example as a limit on
Congress' commerce power in response to the district court which was hard-pressed to
find any activity that Congress could not regulate under the Commerce Clause. See United
States v. Wilson, 880 F. Supp. 621, 625 (E.D. Wis), rev'd, 73 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 1995).
205. Maryland v. W-=rz, 392 U.S. 183, 196-97 n.27 (1968), overruled by National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). Actually, the Court might accept the
link to interstate commerce if the employee had moved from one state to live and work
in another state where the abortion clinic was operating. The fact that the employee
moved in 1973, for example, might not be a barrier since the employee did, in fact, cross
state lines. This is similar to how the Court has upheld convictions for felony possession
of firearms on the basis that the firearm had once traveled across state lines, even if the
interstate movement of the firearm occurred many years before. See Scarborough v. United
States, 431 U.S. 563, 575 (1977). Furthermore, the nexus to interstate commerce need not
even be contemporaneous with the defendant's possession of the firearm. See id. at 577;
see also Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 212, 213 (1976) (finding a sufficient nexus to
interstate commerce when a firearm purchased by a felon from a retailer had previously
been shipped through interstate commerce to the retailer). These cases underscore how
attenuated the nexus to interstate commerce can be for Congress to regulate. A gun that
traveled two centuries ago across state boundaries could satisfy the requisite nexus. Before
Lopez, at least, it was not completely fanciful to speculate whether Congress could regulate an individual's behavior simply on the grounds that the person crossed state lines at
one time in his life, crossed state lines while he was in his mother's womb, or inherited
from his parents genes that had once crossed state lines!
206. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 115 (1942).
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because of the already limited number of abortion providers across
the country and because additional closings would further limit the
availability of abortion services.' Congress found that abortion
clinics are located in only seventeen percent of all counties in the
United States, 208 and that anti-abortion blockades and sabotage
have a "negative effect" on interstate commerce.2" However, the

207. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
208. See H.R. REP. No. 103-306, at 8 (1993), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 699, 705.
209. See S. REP. No. 103-117, at 31 (1993). The Senate Labor and Human Resources
Committee equated "negative effect' with a reduction in the interstate movement of people
and goods. See S. REt'. No. 101-117, at 31. This would be analogous to the situations in
Heart of Atlanta and Katzenbach, where Congress had power to regulate motels and restaurants with discriminatory practices because such practices inhibited the interstate movement of many blacks and reduced interstate commerce. See Heart of Atlanta v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241, 252-53 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 299-300
(1964). However, the conference committee deleted the findings from the Senate bill and
incorporated them in the purpose section. Instead, the conference said that Congress had
found that the "interstate campaign of violence" against abortion services providers "burdenied] interstate commerce by forcing patients to travel from states where their access to
reproductive health services is obstructed to other states." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-488,
at 7, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 699, 724. However, the rationale that anti-abortion
violence "burdens" commerce "by forcih-g patients to travel" from one state to another
state seems upside down. How does anti-abortion violence burden interstate commerce if it
forces individuals to travel to other states to obtain an abortion? Rather than burdening, it
is promoting interstate commerce. If that is the rationale, then it is not analogous to
Heart of Atlanta and the Access Act would actually be burdening interstate commerce.
One proposal for establishing substantive limits on the commerce power might be to
play off this notion of "burdening" interstate commerce. The commerce power could be
limited to instances where it is invoked to promote interstate commerce. Cirillo and
Eisenhofer, for example, suggest that a judicially enforceable limit on the commerce power would be to restrict "congressional regulation of intrastate activity to instances where
Congress had acted to protect the national economic health." Cirillo & Eisenhofer, supra note 43, at 922. This proposal finds support in the fact that one of the primary reasons for adopting the Constitution was to deal with the ruinous trade wars between the
states under the Articles of Confederation. The Commerce Clause was to be used merely
for regulating trade barriers between the states. See id.at 905; see also 2 M. FARRAND,
THm REcORDS OF THE CoNVENnON OF 1787, 17, 478 (1911) (discussing how Madison
wrote that the Commerce Clause was intended as a "negative and preventive provision
against injustice among the States themselves"). Under this view, Congress was afforded
the power to regulate interstate commerce so as to promote it, owing to the fact that the
states were ineffective at the task. By contrast, Congress would not have authority to
deliberately pass legislation that burdened interstate commerce, especially if the burden fell
more heavily on certain states.
Unfortunately, it seems perverse to strip Congress of power to regulate anti-abortion
violence on the theory that it would burden interstate commerce. Instead, it would be
better to burden interstate commerce than to tolerate violence against citizens seeking to
exercise their federal constitutional rights. Moreover, if the commerce power is plenary, as
Chief Justice Marshall stated in Gibbons, then Congress seemingly should be able to
promote or burden interstate commerce at its discretion. Most importantly, however, while
Congress would discourage the interstate movement of people (since women would no
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small number of abortion clinics are not relatively minor interstate
actors-they are not like Filbum and his home-grown wheat. Instead, they engage in a considerable volume of business. For example, it was reported that about 1.5 million abortions were performed in 1992 ° Thus, the closure of even a few abortion clinics could result in a substantial decline of business, affecting both
the clinics and their suppliers. In this sense, the small number of
clinics are analogous to the small number of individuals or groups
engaging in loanshark activities in Perez whose activities collectively drained large amounts of money from the economy2 "
The problem, however, is that the Court will never inquire into
whether there are a large number of clinics whose negligible activities, in the aggregate, have a substantial effect on interstate commerce, or whether there are only a few clinics that individually
engage in a significant volume of business.2" 2 To do otherwise
would require the Court to invade the fact-finding province of
Congress. As the Court in Hodel v. Indiana2 3 stated, the appropriate inquiry under rational basis review is "not how much commerce is involved but whether Congress could rationally conclude
that the regulated activity affects interstate commerce." 21 4 Thus,
the convenient marriage of the rational basis test to the aggregation
principle demonstrates the futility in finding any substantive limits
to the Commerce Clause.
Finally, even if the Court were to give less deference to
Congress' conclusions that an activity substantially affects interstate

longer need to travel and instead would be able to remain in their own states to get an
abortion) Congress would concurrently be promoting the interstate movement of goods if
more clinics remain in business and purchase medical supplies from interstate dealers.
Thus, it would be nearly impossible for the Court to separate what effects a particular
congressional regulation might have on interstate commerce. Such an approach to limiting
the Commerce Clause would be untenable and at odds with the plenary notion of commerce power, and would draw the Court into a nightmarish fact-finding quagmire.
210. See Lynda Gotov, Abortion Seekers Come From Many Backgrounds, BOSTON
GLOBE, Jan. 9, 1995, at 5.
211. See United States v. Perez, 402 U.S. 146, 147 n.1 (1971) (noting that organized
crime activities involve billions of dollars per year).
212. See supra note 105.
213. 452 U.S. 314 (1981). Hodel involved a challenge to the "prime farmland" provisions of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 on the grounds that
there was an insubstantial effect on interstate commerce because the appellees' surface

mining constituted only 0.006% of the country's total prime farmland per year. See id. at
321.
214. Id. at 324 (emphasis added).
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commerce, such as under a "toughened" rational basis test,2"' the
aggregation principle itself "has no stopping point."2 6 Even if a
court held that abortion protest activities do not have a substantial
effect on interstate commerce, Congress could return and enact an
omnibus Access Act that prohibits other obstructive protesting of
commercial entities. For example, the statute could, along with
anti-abortion protests of clinics, also regulate demonstrations by
environmentalist groups that disrupt the premises of oil companies
as well as rallies by animal-rights advocates that block facilities
conducting animal research. In doing so, Congress could encompass
more activities within its regulatory sphere21 7 and satisfy the substantial effects requirement.
In the end, the substantial effects test is' actually a quasi-procedural requirement. True, from a substantive constraint standpoint,
certain activities do not theoretically satisfy the standard. That is,
not every human activity substantially affects interstate commerce.
However, in practice, it is for Congress a mere procedural formality of widening its regulatory orbit to embrace a sufficient number
of activities. As the omnibus Access Act example more than clearly demonstrates, and as Justice Thomas pointed out in his concurrence in Lopez, "one always can draw the circle broadly enough to
cover an activity that, when taken in isolation, would not have
substantial effects on commerce."2 " Thus, the difference between
the simple "affects" test in Riely and the "substantial effect" standard in Lopez is illusory and hence useless as a substantive limitation on the commerce power. This is not to say, however, that no
courts have attempted to fashion substantive limits to the Commerce Clause. In fact, even one pre-Lopez case took up the challenge.

215. See supra note 195.
216. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1650 (Thomas, J., concurring).
217. Cf. Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers": In
Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752, 802 (1995) (arguing that while
the precise line where interstate commerce ends is unclear, "[a]ny first-year law student
can show by cumulating individually insignificant effects that any given congressional
regulation of commerce rationally might be based on the belief that a state activity was
generating significant external effects on other states and thus on interstate commerce").
218. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1650 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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3. Wilson's Attempt at Articulating a Limit
Despite the hostility toward substantive limits under the Court's
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the district court in United States
v. Wilson2 9 still found the Access Act unconstitutional.2 However, Wilson is only one of two decisions holding that Congress
has exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause by enacting
the Access Act." Moreover, the reasoning in Wilson was not
persuasive on appeal to the Seventh Circuit where the district
court's decision was reversed even after Lopez. 2
In striking down the Access Act, the district court in Wilson
adhered to the modem, and deferential, rule under Hodel and admitted that'' Congress' power under that body of case law was
"extensive. " Yet the district court also emphasized that there
were constitutionally mandated limits to Congress' power under the
Commerce Clause. The district court also cited Hodel for the proposition that "[i]t would be a mistake to conclude that Congress'
power to regulate pursuant to the Commerce Clause is unlimited.
Some activities may be so private or local in nature that they

simply may not be in Commerce."

4

The court emphasized that

the commerce power is an enumerated power and that because the
exercise of that power had rarely been struck down under the
rational basis test, it was "difficult for lower courts to perceive any
articulable limits."
Nevertheless, because the commerce power

219. 880 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Wis.), rev'd, 73 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 1995).
220. The district court ultimately concluded that the Access Act had transgressed the
outer limit of the Commerce Clause that the Court had consistently reaffirmed existed.
See id at 624-25; see also NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937) (Commerce Clause cannot be extended so as to obliterate the distinction between local and
national); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 310-11
(1981) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (it is "a mistake to conclude that [the commerce power]
is unlimited").
221. Interestingly, the district court's opinion in Wilson is a pre-Lopez decision and
reveals how lower court judges had become uncomfortable with the incessant advance
toward federalization even before Lopez articulated this concern. The Access Act is not
the only recent federal statute to be declared unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause.
See also United States v. Cortner, 834 F. Supp. 242, 242 (M.D. Tenn. 1993), rev'd sub
nom. United States v. Osteen, 30 F.3d 135 (6th Cir. 1994) (striking down Anti-Car Theft
Act of 1992, 18 U.S.C. § 2119); United States v. Massari, 894 F. Supp. 1360 (D. Ariz.
1995) (striking down Child Support Recovery Act of 1992) rev'd, remanded 95 F.3d 787
(9th Cir. 1996).
222. See Wilson, 73 F.3d at 675.
223. See Wilson, 880 F. Supp. at 624.
224. Id. at 625 (emphasis omitted).
225. Id. at 624.
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is "only one of several defined and enumerated powers," it cannot
be unlimited.' The district court thus relied on the principle that
Congress' power is plenary, but only within its sphere. The difficult issue was to determine the outer limits of the sphere. '
In its effort to articulate limits on the commerce power, the
district court focused on the rational basis test. The court focused
on the meaning of "rational" and argued that "it cannot mean the
Court will defer to Congress only if it acts upon the 'most
rational' basis available to it."' The court conceded that the wisdom of public policy is rarely a concern of federal courts. 9 On
the other hand, federal courts are not to defer to Congress "simply
because it [acts] in a purely 'logical' sense," as "there may always
be a plausible rationale for Congressional action that meets the
requirements of simple logic." This is not enough because "in
a logical sense, all activity 'affects' commerce because 'there is no
private activity, no matter how local and insignificant, the ripple
affect from which is not on some theoretical measure ultimately
felt beyond the border of the state in which it took place."'" 1
In its rational basis analysis, the district court then asked:
"Does the logic of the Congressional findings made with respect to
the non-violent physical obstruction of reproductive health services
clinics provide a basis for federal regulation of any human activity?"' 2 The court would not accept a rationale that would give
Congress regulatory power over every human activity. 3 Thus,

226. Id. at 625.
227. See id.
228. Wilson, 880 F. Supp. at 625.
229. See id.
230. Id.
231. Id. (citing United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1993)). The district
court's reliance on the Fifth Circuit's analogy in Lopez is illustrative. The "ripple effect"

analogy is powerful because it allows us to imagine the smallest disturbance in a perfectly still pool of water growing to disturb the entire pool.
232. Id. at 630.
233. Wilson, 880 F. Supp. at 632. The Supreme Court employed a similar approach in
Lopez, arguing that "if we were to accept the Government's arguments, we are hardpressed to posit any activity by an individual that Congress is without power to regulate."

Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632. The majority seemed to be wary "of regulatory rationales that
would encompass all forms of human behavior." Merritt, supra note 158 at 712. Professor
H. Jefferson Powell calls this a "test of consequences." This is an implied approach in
Lopez and "suggests that it is not enough to make the positive argument that a given
statute has a substantial relationship to interstate commerce; it is also necessary to make
the essentially negative demonstration that one can with logical consistency prove some
other, hypothetical statute unconstitutional." Powell, supra note 146, at 656.
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having reformulated the meaning of "rational" under the rational
basis test, the district court in Wilson was then prepared to deal
with the "four basic findings" amassed by Congress to support the
Access Act.
a. Four Basic Congressional Findings to
Support the Access Act
The district court first reviewed Congress' finding that "abortion clinics operate within the stream of commerce because they
purchase supplies, employ staff, own and lease office space and
generate income."'
As expected, the court found this rationale
unsatisfactory because all persons and entities operate, in theory,
within the stream of interstate commerce? 35 Based on such reasoning, the commerce power would know no limits because the
logic of such a finding provides a basis for federalizing all spheres
of human activity.36
Congress' second finding, that some individuals travel across
state lines in order to provide or obtain services, was similarly
disposed of by the district court because it "[did] not distinguish
abortion from any other human activity." 7 Once again, permitting Congress to rely on this rationale would extend the commerce
power "to any sphere of human activity." 8
Congress' third finding was that abortion protesters obstruct
access to clinics and that the inability to obtain an abortion has a
negative effect on interstate commerce. As with the other two
findings, the court found that the logic of this rationale would
afford Congress "the power to regulate any non-commercial intrastate activity that.., negatively affects a commercial entity oper-

234. Wilson, 880 F. Supp. at 630.
235. See id.
236. The court added that "[a]ll Americans enter the stream of commerce through the
purchase of goods, however minimal those purchases may be." Id. If Congress were permitted to rely on the stream of commerce rationale, "no one [would be] immune from
federal regulation under the Commerce power." Id.

237. Id.
238. Id. at 631. The same considerations may also have driven Lopez. Professor Merritt
suggests that one of the motivations in Lopez was the "majority's wariness of regulatory
rationales that would encompass all forms of human behavior." Merritt, supra note 158, at
712. Indeed, Rehnquist in Lopez said that "if we were to accept the Government's arguments, we are hard-pressed to posit any activity by an individual that Congress is without
power to regulate." Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632. Rehnquist was also critical of the dissent
which was "unable to identify any activity that States may regulate but Congress may
not." Id.
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ating within the stream of commerce.""' 9 The court argued such a
rationale would allow Congress to regulate shoplifting because it
reduces the supply of goods, to regulate dieting because it reduces
the demand for certain food, or to regulate breast-feeding because
it reduces the demand for formula.'2 '
Finally, the court rejected Congress' finding that the problem
of abortion protesting and violence is nationwide in scope and
beyond the control of the states. The court argued that simply
because a problem is national in scope, or is one that is beyond
the ability of the states to control, does not give Congress the
power to regulate it unless it also "substantially affect[s] interstate
commerce."24' The court argued that as an alternative to relying
on the commerce power to deal with law enforcement emergencies
of the states, such emergencies can be dealt with under 42 U.S.C.
§ 10501, which authorizes the Attorney General to make available
federal law enforcement resources to the states.242
The Seventh Circuit in Wilson was persuaded only by the last
argument of the district court, which provided that the substantial
effects test is not satisfied if Congress merely attempts to regulate
a problem that is nationwide in scope like the obstruction of reproductive health facilities.243 Yet the Seventh Circuit did consider
this fourth finding of Congress as further confirmation that Congress was attempting "to address a truly interstate problem by
enacting the Access Act."2" As to the first three findings, the
Seventh Circuit found that the district court had failed to properly
apply the substantial effects test.24 The Seventh Circuit suggested, for example, that "it is plainly rational that reproductive health

239. Wilson, 880 F. Supp. at 631.
240. See id. at 631 n.17.
241. Id. at 631.
242. See id.
243. See United States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675, 683 (7th Cir. 1995).
244. Id.
245. See ic at 681-82. Ironically, the application of the substantial effects test by the
district court in Wilson is not too far removed from the Court's application in Lopez. The
district court focused more on the implications of upholding the Access Act for
Congress's commerce power than the effects of abortion protests on interstate commerce.
See Wilson, 880 F. Supp. at 630. Similarly, the Court in Lopez "never directly addressed
the arguments that gun possession in school zones could substantially affect interstate
commerce. Rather, it considered instead the implications of accepting [the government's
arguments in support of the statute]." MeJohn, supra note 146, at 28-29 (footnotes and
emphasis omitted).
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facilities are engaged in interstate commerce and that obstruction of
such facilities brings the commerce to a halt."'2
Further, the Seventh Circuit was unpersuaded by the district
court's view that the rationales proffered by Congress would allow
it to regulate virtually any activity. Instead, it maintained that the
substantial effects requirement represents the limit to congressional
power under the Commerce Clause.' Thus, for example, where
the district court argued that Congress might be able to regulate
shoplifting because such activity reduces the supply of goods,2 '
the Seventh Circuit argued that Congress had a "probable lack of
'
authority to regulate [such activities]."249
The Seventh Circuit
found that the district court erred by assuming that congressional
findings would automatically validate the Access Act under the
rational basis test. Instead, the rational basis test "requires courts to
defer to Congress on a case-by-case basis when Congress' findings
reveal a substantial relation to interstate commerce." '
This assumes, of course, that the substantial effects test can
function as an effective limit on Congress under rational basis
review." Yet, it is not clear whether a federal shoplifting statute
would survive the rational basis test. After all, Congress could
rationally conclude that shoplifting, like abortion protesting, results
in a commensurate decline in the supply of goods. Moreover, while
the Seventh Circuit admonished the district court for its conclusion
that Congress possesses virtually unlimited authority to regulate
under the substantial effects test, the Seventh Circuit's own conclusion is belied by the fact that the aggregation principle allows
Congress to aggregate a sufficient number of activities in one
regulatory sphere to satisfy the substantial effects test, as the previous section explained. 2 For example, in drafting a federal statute, Congress could simply aggregate shoplifting activities with
other forms of theft that injure interstate businesses. This would
satisfy the substantial effects test because, as Justice Thomas makes
plain in Lopez, "[e]ven though particular sections [of the statute]

246. Wilson, 73 F.3d at 681.
247. See id.
248. See Wilson, 880 F. Supp. at 631 n.17.

249. Wilson, 73 F.3d at 682. The Seventh Circuit argued that "[a] mere decrease in the
sale or purchase of goods or services would not qualify" as a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Id.
250. See id. at 682 n.7.
251. See supra notes 202-18 and accompanying text.
252. See supra notes 205-18 and accompanying text.
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may govern only trivial activities, [as shoplifting might be], the
statute in the aggregate regulates matters that substantially affect
commerce. ' 3 Ironically, the Seventh Circuit's suggestion that
Congress lacks the authority to enact such a statute plunges it into

the same non-deferential mode of review that it criticized the district court for engaging in and which the Seventh Circuit itself had
described as "seriously flawed."'54
In the end, though, the Seventh Circuit correctly held that the
district court did not simply alter the rational basis test but com-

pletely reworked it.55 The district court had argued that "[ifn order for Congress to justify its regulation of purely local, non-vio-

lent, non-commercial activity, there must be a connection between
the activity and interstate commerce that is 'rational' both as a
matter of simple logic and within the context of the Constitution
6 Unfortunately, the
and the structural limitation created therein."'5
district court's searching inquiry is incompatible with the rational
basis
257 test, and actually transforms its review into heightened scruti-

ny.

Nevertheless, the district court should be commended for recognizing that rational review, without more, leads to irrational results
under a system of enumerated powers. The district court's opinion
effectively highlights how Congress has used the Commerce Clause
to regulate spheres of activity traditionally thought to be the prerogatives of the states-such as states' control over local criminal
activity." 8 The court's opinion also reflects how the balance be-

253. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1650 (Thomas, J., concurring). In fact, Congress could also
pass a simple statute without aggregating other forms of theft. Shoplifting activities in
fifty states no doubt could have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. At a minimum, Congress could have a rational basis for so concluding.
254. See Wilson, 73 F.3d at 682 n.7.
255. See id.
256. Wilson, 880 F. Supp. at 626 (emphasis omitted).
257. See United States v. White, 893 F. Supp. 1442, 1434 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
258. The Supreme Court has stated that when Congress criminalizes conduct already
subject to state criminal jurisdiction, it "effect[s] a significant change in the sensitive
relation between federal and state criminal jurisdiction." United States v. Enmons, 410
U.S. 396 (1973). Yet the issue cannot simply be framed in terms of whether an activity
has "traditionally" been thought to belong to the states. Instead, the issue is whether there
is an inherent limit to the Commerce Clause because it is an enumerated power and thus
leaves certain spheres exclusively to the states. Even the Tenth Amendment may have a
role. The district court in Wilson drew upon the Tenth Amendment and argued that the
closer a Commerce Clause regulation "falls within the ordinary course of local affairs and
touches the ordinary course of people's lives and properties, such as the [Access Act's]
regulation of non-violent trespass, the stronger the confirmation by the Tenth Amendment
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tween the federal and state governments has become so skewed
that it is virtually impossible to square today's Commerce Clause
jurisprudence with Justice Marshall's admonition in Gibbons that
the Commerce Clause is "limited to specified objects. ' ' "s9 A closer
analysis of the district court's treatment of Commerce Clause precedent may help verify the proposition that the commerce power
has grown into a virtually unlimited enumerated power and is no
longer limited to specific objects.

that Congress has exceeded the scope of its enumerated power and is 'subject to limits.'"
Wilson, 880 F. Supp. at 634.
259. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 wheat.) 1, 203 (1824). It can be argued that
Marshall's construction of the Commerce Clause has remained static, and that it is the
nature of the economy that has changed. That is, as Justice O'Connor observed in New
York, "As interstate commerce has become ubiquitous, activities once considered purely
local have come to have effects on the national economy, and have accordingly come
within the scope of Congress' commerce power." New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144, 158 (1992). It can no doubt be conceded that Congress' power under the Commerce
Clause has been influenced by the growth of a highly integrated economy.
The district court in Wilson also raised the "growth of the economy" argument as a
source of authority for federal regulation, but it noted the "obvious tension" with that
concept and the concept of enumerated powers. Wilson, 880 F. Supp. at 632 n.19. The
court found difficulty in the fact that "as it is more fully understood and accepted that all
human activity has [commercial ramifications], Congress increasingly relies upon this abstract principle to offer boilerplate commercial rationales to regulate purely local activities
for the purpose of achieving purely social objectives" Ld.Of course, congressional authority is not limited solely to economic objectives. It has clearly been established that Congress can invoke the Commerce Clause for social, as well as economic reasons. See supra
notes 99-103 and accompanying text. A better argument is that "[tihere has been no basic
transformation in the economy that requires, or allows, a parallel transformation in the
scope of the commerce clause." Epstein, supra note 62, at 1397. This argument acknowledges that the states have always been affected by economies in other states and that
national economic policies have always influenced a state's economic well-being. See id.
at 1396. Thus, it is the conception of the Commerce Clause, and Congress' power thereunder that has changed, rather than the basic economic framework. Certain activities in
1824, such as activities regulated by inspection laws, admittedly influenced commerce
"considerably," as Chief Justice Marshall said in Gibbons, and yet were deemed prerogatives of the states since they did not yet enter interstate commerce. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) at 203. Most importantly, can it really be admitted that the Framers were so
short of foresight that they did not envision the growth of an integrated national economy
that would connect the entire country? Did they truly expect that their carefully crafted
system of government grounded on the doctrine of enumerated powers would know fewer
and fewer limits as the economy grew? If they expected it,
then why did they not just
fashion a system of government that had unlimited, rather than enumerated, powers? See
supra note 43.

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47.553

b. No Longer Limited to Specified Objects
The concept of an unlimited enumerated power, as the commerce power may be today, is fundamentally inconsistent with our
constitutional tradition of limited government. Reaching such an
extreme, however, has required courts to endorse further and further extensions of precedent at the behest of Congress. Wilson is
merely exemplary of how some federal courts have become uncomfortable with this seemingly endless extension of congressional
power and have sought to draw limits. For example, the district
court refused to sustain the Access Act under the Heart of Atlanta
and Katzenbach line of cases because that line involves the regulation of commercial entities, whereas the Access Act involves the
regulation of private, non-commercial conduct that affects commercial entities that receive goods that travel in interstate commerce.'
Despite this distinction between the Access Act and
Heart of Atlanta, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court,
arguing that the Access Act does "regulate a commercial activity--the provision of reproductive health services."' It held that
"[tihe Access Act regulates this commercial activity by preventing
its obstruction." 2' However, the majority's reasoning is flawed. It
plainly mischaracterizes the object of the Access Act, as the district
court in Wilson' and the dissenting judge on the Seventh Circuit
appeal" had argued.
How does the Access Act regulate commercial activity by
preventing its obstruction? It does not do so by imposing any
obligations on reproductive health facilities. Rather, the Act regulates abortion protesters who, in turn, affect such facilities. Even
the district court conceded that Congress could regulate the clinics
themselves.' However, unlike the Seventh Circuit, it found that

260. See Wilson, 880 F. Supp. at 628.
261. Wilson, 73 F.3d at 683
262. Id.
263. The district court judge argued that the Access Act "does not regulate commercial
entities, but rather... private conduct affecting commercial entities which in turn receive
goods that have traveled in interstate commerce." Wilson, 880 F. Supp. at 628.
264. The dissent in Wilson argued that "[a] fundamental problem with the majority's
analysis is that it confuses and misrepresents the regulatory thrust of the statute" because
the Access Act applies to abortion demonstrators-a "purely noncommercial activity."
Wilson, 73 F.3d at 692 (Coffey, J., dissenting).
265. See Wilson, 880 F. Supp. at 628.

19971

THE ACCESS ACT

603

Congress instead "chose to regulate conduct one step removed from
the commercial enterprise."
Surprisingly, though, even the district court underestimated the
true state of affairs. The Access Act, in fact, is actually two steps
removed from the Heart of Atlanta line of cases. The Supreme
Court took the first step in 1995 when it upheld congressional
regulation in Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies v. Dobson. 7 The
Terminix case involved a commercial contract between a single
Alabama homeowner and a local franchise of Terminix International Company-a termite control company that operated in several
states and received supplies from out-of-state. The homeowner
brought suit against the company which then moved to compel
arbitration pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act.' In upholding
the Act's application to the homeowner, the Court allowed Congress not only to regulate the employees or employers of commercial entities, such as the hotel and restaurant operators in Heart of
Atlanta and Katzenbach, but also its customers as well."0 Thus,
the regulations of the Access Act are two steps removed from the
commercial enterprise. They do not regulate the commercial entities
(clinics) themselves or their employees, nor the customers (patients)
of such entities. Instead they regulate those who would obstruct the
customers or employees of such entities. The analogue in Heart of
Atlanta and Katzenbach would be for Congress not to regulate the
motel or restaurant operators or employees, nor the patrons of such
establishments, but instead the racists who intimidate and threaten
the use of violence against employees or individuals who have
patronized the motels or restaurants."

266. Wilson, 880 F. Supp. at 628 (emphasis added). But see United States v. White,
893 F. Supp. 1423, 1434 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (arguing that the Wilson district court's conclu-

sion that the Access Act was without precedential support because Congress' chosen method was one step removed "ignored Congress' 'institutional competence' in selecting appropriate means to address a problem it had found to be national in scope and effect").
267. 115 S. Ct. 834 (1995).
268. See id. at 837.
269. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
270. See Merritt, supra note 158, at 734 (noting that federal power over a customer
was approved).
271. At least the regulation in Terminix was immediately associated with a commercial

transaction-a termite contract. With the Access Act, by contrast, Congress has reached
even activities that are potentially distant in time and place from the abortion clinics. The
prohibitions in the Access Act apply to a person who threatens the use of force against a
woman or a doctor in their home because such persons have obtained or provide reproductive health services. See Tribe, supra note 22, at 294. In fact, some critics have pointed out that the Access Act could plausibly be applied to a pastor, for example, "whose
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Clearly, Congress has broken new Commerce Clause ground
with the Access Act. It would therefore require an extension of
precedent to sustain the Access Act under the Heart of Atlanta line
of cases. However, as the district court properly recognized, there
are several other lines of authority that Congress can seize upon to
justify the Access Act. For instance, the Supreme Court has approved the federal regulation of private conduct that interferes with
businesses in interstate commerce by upholding the Hobbs Act.'
The Hobbs Act provides for the punishment of anyone who "in
any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the
movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or
extortion."
By upholding the Hobbs Act, the Court provided
Congress with significant precedential value to justify the Access
Act because abortion protesters clearly can have the effect of delaying and obstructing interstate commerce.'

sermon advocates peaceful blocking of access to an abortion clinic, because the message
might intimidate someone who is thinking about going to the clinic." Steven T.
McFarland, Pro-Lifers' New Legal Nightmare: Federal Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Law; FACE, CHRIS
NrTy TODAY, Aug. 15, 1994.
272. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (1994). The Hobbs Act was first upheld by the Court in
United States v. Green, 350 U.S. 415 (1956).
273. § 1951(a). Two lower courts have upheld the Hobbs Act following Lopez. See
United States v. Stillo, 57 F.3d 553, 558 n.2 (7th Cir.) (holding the Hobbs Act constitutional in light of Lopez because unlike the school gun ban, it is aimed at an economic
activity (extortion) and contains an express jurisdictional element), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
383 (1995); United States v. Arena, 894 F. Supp. 580, 584 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding
defendant's reliance on Lopez as misplaced because unlike the Gun-Free School Zones
Act, the Hobbs Act requires a connection to interstate commerce).
Some courts have held that, under the Hobbs Act, the government need only show
that robbery or extortion has a "de minimis" effect on interstate commerce. See, e.g.,
United States v. Collins, 40 F.3d 95 (5th Cir. 1994). Of course, Collins was a pre-Lopez
decision. At the same time, however, the Fifth Circuit in Collins found an insufficiently
direct effect on interstate commerce from the robbery of a homeowner's cash, jewelry,
clothes, and car with cellular phone. The Fifth Circuit held that finding an effect on
interstate commerce from the robbery of an individual who was an employee of an interstate business would render the Hobbs Act "ubiquitous, and any robbery, in our closelyinterwoven economy, arguably would affect interstate commerce." Id. at 100. The Fifth
Circuit seemed to distinguish between robberies affecting businesses in interstate commerce
and robberies affecting individuals employed by those businesses-a "distinction [that]
evokes the Supreme Court's separation of commercial and noncommercial activities in
Lopez." Merritt, supra note 158, at 716. The Fifth Circuit's distinction is instructive because empirically, the robbery of the individual's items most likely had some effect on
interstate commerce. As the government argued in Collins, the robbery prevented the
victim from attending a business meeting and precluded him from using his cellular phone
for business calls. See Collins, 40 F.3d at 99.
274. See Merritt, supra note 158, at 725 (noting that there is a strong connection between reproductive health services and interstate commerce).

19971

THE ACCESS ACT

605

The district court in Wilson was far less successful in distinguishing the Hobbs Act than it was in distinguishing Heart of
Atlanta and Katzenbach. This is not surprising given the breadth of
this line of Commerce Clause authority. Nevertheless, the district
court in Wilson sought to distinguish such cases as Stirone v. United States,7 5 in which the Hobbs Act had been applied, as well as
such cases as Russell v. United States,276 in which Title XI of the
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 had been applied. ' The
district court found that statutes in cases like Russell and Stirone
had been upheld by the Court because Congress sought to regulate
"activities that employ violent means to achieve an economic purpose."' 8 By contrast, the activities targeted by the Access Act
involve non-violent physical obstructions of abortion clinics that do
"not employ violent means to achieve an economic purpose; rather,
[they] employ[] non-violent means to achieve a purely political or
social purpose." ' 9 Unfortunately, as the next section shows, the
district court's analysis in Wilson is unpersuasive and misinterprets
both the economic goals of abortion protesters as well as congressional authority to regulate conduct that affects interstate commerce. The next section also shows where this analysis can be
strengthened to attack the constitutionality of the Access Act.
c. Abortion Protesters as Economic Activity
The district court in Wilson argued that the- Access Act was
invalid because it sought to regulate individuals who act not with
an economic purpose, but rather out of a political or social motivation.' Similarly, the dissent in the Seventh Circuit decision said
it was "at a loss to comprehend how the protesters, who were taking part in a local act of civil disobedience, can be classified as
having engaged in commercial activity." 1 The dissent argued
that the protesters had "no economic end in view.""

275. 361 U.S. 212 (1960).
276. 471 U.S. 858 (1985). See supra note 163.

277. 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (1994). The statute punishes anyone who "maliciously damages
or destroys, or attempts to damage or destroy, by means of fire or an explosive, any
building, vehicle, or other real or personal property used in interstate or foreign commerce
or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce." § 844(i).
278. Wilson, 880 F. Supp. at 629.

279. Id.
280. See Wilson, 880 F. Supp. at 629.
281. Wilson, 73 F.3d at 692-93 (Coffey, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).

282. Id. at 693.
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However, it is not altogether clear that non-violent abortion
demonstrators who obstruct abortion clinics do not have an economic purpose in mind."ss In seeking to shut down an abortion
clinic, individuals may be acting on a mixture of social, political,
and economic motives.0 Most importantly, even if abortion protesters have absolutely no economic motive, their conduct no doubt

has some economic impact-such as reducing the amount of abortions performed."ss Thus, abortion protesters are not commercial
actors in the sense that they do not seek to enter into a commercial transaction with the clinics to obtain a service. However, they
are economic actors in the sense that their actions have both com-

mercial ramifications-since they reduce the volume of business
conducted at the clinics-as well as economic ramifications-because patients who have appointments with particular
clinics may be turned away and have to expend additional economic resources to travel back the next day."
Finally, whether abortion protesters have an economic motive
(or not) seems to be irrelevant. The Supreme Court has recently

indicated that conduct having economic ramifications need not have
an economic or profit-seeking motive in order for Congress to
283. Some anti-abortion groups, in fact, do seek to financially injure abortion clinics.
For example, in American Life League, Inc. v. Reno, 855 F. Supp. 137, 139 (E.D. Va.
1994), affd, 47 F.3d 642 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 55 (1995), the district court
noted that the American Life League, an organization of abortion protesters that challenged the constitutionality of the Access Act, "intend[s] to interfere with abortion providers and to injure them financially."
284. See Brickey, supra note 15, at 809.
285. The dissent in Wilson argued that the abortion demonstrators in that case "had no
economic end in view: for even if the abortion procedure was free, their goal would
remain unchanged." Wilson, 73 F.3d at 693 (Coffey, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). The
demonstrators' primary motives were not economic, yet that is not to say that they had
no economic end in view-they wanted to block a commercial transaction between doctor
and patient.
286. The abortion protesters in Wilson also forced the Milwaukee fire department to
expend time and resources to reopen the clinics. However, one of the arguments that
Congress advanced to support the Access Act was that such abortion protests were overwhelming state and local law enforcement agencies. See supra text accompanying note 27.
Yet it is clear, at least from the record in Wilson, that federal intervention was unnecessary to deal with abortion protesting. The dissenting judge in Wilson labeled the situation
as "federal overkill." Wilson, 73 F.3d at 698 (Coffey, J., dissenting). Coffey argued that
not only had Congress exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause in enacting the
Access Act, but that Congress had also "disregard[ed] the ability of state and local officials to deal with the disruption cased by the Milwaukee clinic protesters." Id.Moreover,
"[t]his double overkill illustrates the vast distance modern constitutional interpretation has
traveled from the Framers' understanding of the commerce power, and underscores the
dangers of an open-ended interpretation of the Commerce Clause." d. at 698-99.
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regulate it. The Court's principle, moreover, came just one term
before Lopez in National Organization of Women, Inc. v.
Scheidler. NOW was a statutory case involving a civil RICO
suit brought against a coalition of anti-abortion groups who engaged in extortionate activities similar to those described in the
congressional findings for the Access Act." RICO requires that
an enterprise "be engaged in" or "affect" interstate commerce 9
to satisfy the nexus requirement between the enterprise and commerce. The Court held that the term "enterprise," as used in RICO;
did not require that a racketeering activity have an economic motive.2'
In so ruling, the Court in NOW overruled the decisions of three
circuits that had held that an enterprise must have an economic
motiveY1 The Court found that the Court of Appeals had "overlook[ed] the fact that predicate acts such as the alleged extortion,
may not benefit the protestors financially but still may drain money
from the economy by harming businesses such as the clinics...
in this case."2' Thus, anti-abortion protestors need not have an
economic motive because, even if they are only motivated by moral or political reasons, their activities have an economic effect on
interstate commerce. Finally, the focus on the motive of the abortion demonstrators overlooks the fact that under the Hobbs Act, the
Court has upheld convictions regardless of whether the individual
sought to benefit himself economically. 2 Rather, the prevailing
view has been that "Congress's power to regulate ... rests on the
effect on interstate commerce, not on the defendant's motive or
'
means of interference with an interstate business."294
287. 510 U.S. 249 (1994) [hereinafter NOW].
288. See id. at 253.
289. See id. at 258.
290. See id. The Court observed that "[a]n enterprise surely can have a detrimental
influence on interstate or foreign commerce without having its own profit-seeking motives:' Id.
291. See National Organization of Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 968 F.2d 612, 625-30 (7th

Cir. 1992) (abortion protesters do not have requisite economic motive), rev'd, 510 U.S.
249 (1994); United States v. Flynn, 852 F.2d 1045, 1052 (8th Cir.) (stating that enterprise
must have economic end), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 974 (1988); United States v. Bagaric,
706 F.2d 42, 55-58 (2d Cir.) (economic gain is necessary but need not be primary motive), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 840, and cert. denied, 464 U.S. 917 (1983); United States v.

Ivic, 700 F.2d 51, 59-65 (2d Cir. 1983) (stating that political terrorists do not have requisite motive); United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1372 (8th Cir. 1980) (enterprise

must have economic motive), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981).
292. NOW, 510 U.S. at 260.
293. United States v. Green, 350 U.S. 415, 420 (1956).
294. Merritt, supra note 158, at 726 n.232. Merritt shows how anti-abortion activities
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The more difficult issue arises out of the apparent conflict
between NOW and Lopez. The Court in Lopez noted that the GunFree School Zones Act did not regulate "activities that arise out of
or are connected with a commercial transaction."295 The statute
had "nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise."2 Plainly, the activities of the anti-abortion groups do
not "arise out of' a commercial transaction. 2 However, while
they do affect an economic enterprise, they are only "connected
with" a commercial transaction in that they seek to discourage
abortions. They are not commercial actors like the reproductive
health services providers and the individuals seeking such services-both of whom are party to a commercial transaction. 8
Unfortunately, it is unclear how Lopez affects NOW. Professor
Brickey has noted the tension between NOW and Lopez and remarked that "[o]ne might be tempted to attribute this semantic
puzzle to stylish difficulties among members of the Court were it
not for the irony that Justice Rehnquist wrote both the majority
opinion in Lopez and the unanimous opinion in NOW."" 9 Perhaps
if Lopez is construed as embodying the procedural conception of
federalism, the two decisions can be reconciled. Indeed, NOW may
be strong evidence supporting a procedural conception of Lopez
given that NOW came down in 1994, and as the next section
shows, most post-Lopez courts reviewing the constitutionality of the
Access Act have read Lopez in precisely this manner. Nevertheless,
the post-Lopez treatment of the Access Act has not been entirely
uniform as one district court decision has recognized the potential
implications of Lopez for Congress' commerce power when it
struck down the Act as unconstitutional.

targeted by the Access Act are similar to the robbery or extortion activities targeted by
the Hobbs Act since "[p]reventing customers from entering the front door of a health
clinic has the same economic effect as robbing supplies out the back door-regardless of
the defendant's motive or degree of violence." Id.
295. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631 (emphasis added).
296. Id. at 1630-31.
297. See Brickey, supra note 15, at 810.
298. See id. at 810.
299. l at 811 n. 62.
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4. Post-Lopez Challenges to the Access Act
As already noted, the district court in Wilson was overruled by
the Seventh Circuit which held that the Access Act is constitutional
in light of Lopez. In fact, of all the lower courts reviewing the
constitutionality of the Access Act after Lopez, only one court, the
district court in Hoffman v. Hunt,' found it unconstitutional.
Still, the conflicting reasoning between these post-Lopez courts
underscores the uncertainty coming out of Lopez over whether it
embodies a procedural or substantive conception of federalism.
The district court in Hoffman held that while Congress had
supported the Access Act with extensive legislative findings, thus
making it distinguishable from the Gun-Free School Zones Act,
Lopez and the case before it were nevertheless "almost identical."' In both Hoffman and Lopez, for a court to accept the
government's arguments it would have to "pile inference upon
inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional
authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of
the sort retained by the States."
The district court in Hoffman
refused to expand Congress' power in this manner because to do
so would require it "to conclude that the Constitution's enumeration of powers does not presuppose something not enumerated."30 3
Thus, the district court properly recognized that the concept of an
unlimited enumerated power is inconsistent with our constitutional
scheme of limited government.
In reviewing the legislative findings advanced by Congress to
support the Access Act, the district court in Hoffman agreed with
the Seventh Circuit's argument in Wilson that Congress is not
provided with a basis to regulate abortion protest activities merely
because the problem may be national in scope.3 However, unlike the Seventh Circuit, the district court also properly recognized
that the regulatory object of the Access Act is abortion protesters,
not the abortion clinics themselves? 5 This observation led the
district court to the appropriate inquiry of whether Congress has

300. 923 F. Supp. 791
301. See id.at 812.
302. Id. at 807 (citing
303. Id. (citing Lopez,
Wheat.) 1 (1824))).
304. See id.
305. See Hoffman, 923

(W.D.N.C. 1996).
Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634).
115 S. Ct. at 1634 (referring to Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9

F. Supp. at 807-08.
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the authority, in light of Lopez, to regulate noncommercial abortion
protest activities. Thus, under this analysis, Lopez and Hoffinan

were virtually identical for the district court because, like with gun
possession near schools, Congress in the Access Act had attempted
to regulate an activity that "is not commerce or economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms." In other
words, and very importantly, the district court in Hoffman viewed

Lopez as embodying a substantive conception of federalism when it
argued that "[t]he Lopez Court made clear that congressional authority over those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce ... is limited to those activities that can fairly be characterized as commercial or economic."
Under this view, certain activities would be immune from federal regulation, notwithstanding
their effect on interstate commerce, because to decide otherwise
would be to permit Congress to "regulate such subjects as family
law, day-care, education, and any other facet of our daily lives...
by simply finding that those activities substantially affect interstate
commerce; for those activities surely do affect interstate commerce
more than [abortion protest activities do].""3 8
The district court in Hoffman also found the Access Act deficient in both a procedural and quasi-procedural respect in finding
that: (1) the Access Act lacks a jurisdictional element;" and (2)
the legislative findings for the Access Act failed to establish a
substantial effect on interstate commerce from abortion protest
activities."' However, the Court's agreement with the substantive

306. Id. at 813 (citing Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631).
307. IaL at 813-14. Thus, the district court argued that the Eleventh Circuit's decision in
Cheffner v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517 (11th Cir. 1995), and the Seventh Circuit's decision in
United States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 1995), both upholding the Access Act on
Commerce Clause grounds, were wrongly decided because they "ignore the Supreme
Court's instruction [from Lopez] that Congress' authority to regulate activities that substantially affect interstate commerce is limited to the regulation of commercial or economic
activities that substantially affect interstate commerce." Hoffman, 923 F. Supp. at 814
(citing Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630-31).
308. Hoffman, 923 F. Supp. at 814. The district court argued that such an expansive
conception of the commerce power would give the federal government "a plenary power"
to enact any type of legislation, and that this would thus "eviscerate the limited government secured by the enumeration of federal powers contained in the Constitution." Ld.
(citing Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1633).
309. See id. at 817 (citing Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631).
310. See id. at 814. The district court claimed that "[a]t best, the congressional findings
serve to establish a trivial or merely incidental impact that these protest activities have on
interstate commerce." Id. at 816.
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conception of Lopez is the most significant, and potentially farreaching, aspect of its decision." '
Unfortunately, Hoffman is alone in its post-Lopez treatment of
the Access Act as every other lower court addressing the constitutionality of the statute has upheld it under the Commerce Clause.
The court in United States v. White' did not consider Lopez to
be a major obstacle to the constitutionality of the Access Act at
all. The defendants in White had argued that Lopez supports their
contention that Congress' findings for the Access Act are not rational because such findings would allow Congress to regulate any
activity." 3 The district court in White, however, did not see any
direct connection between the two cases. It argued that federal
courts must defer to Congress if they find "any rational basis" for
a finding that an activity substantially affects interstate commerce.3 4 In so holding, the White court felt compelled to respond
to the district court in Wilson by arguing that "[wlith all due respect, it does appear that the court [in Wilson] substituted its own
findings for those of Congress"3 5" and that it had "converted the
'
rational basis test into one involving the strictest scrutiny."3 16
In upholding the Access Act, the district court in White first
distinguished Lopez by noting that the effect of clinic violence on
interstate commerce, unlike the effect of guns near schools, was
well-documented. 1 7 This holding embodies the procedural conception of Lopez because White reads Lopez as an example of Congress failing to meet the procedural requirement of findings in a
case where the connection to interstate commerce is not immediately evident to the court.1 The district court also argued that, unlike gun possession near schools, the campaign against abortion
clinics is national in scope319 and that abortion violence has clear
311. The district court did note, however, that its decision is not alarming as Congress
would still have vast regulatory authority even under its conception of Lopez. See
Hoffman, 923 F.Supp. at 819.
312. 893 F. Supp. 1423 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
313. See id. at 1432. Such an argument is not groundless after Lopez. The district court
in Wilson argued that the rationales advanced by Congress to support the Access Act
would allow Congress to regulate "any sphere of human activity." See Wilson, 880 F.
Supp. at 631. Similarly, the Court in Lopez was concerned with rationales of Congress
that would give it unlimited power to regulate. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632.
314. See White, 893 F. Supp. at 1432.
315. Id.
316. Id.

317. See id. at 1433.
318. See Lopez, 115 S. CL at 1631.
319. This could be another distinguishing factor from Lopez. Congress passed the Access
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"commercial ramifications involving patients, providers, and clinic
staff members. a'' Ultimately, and most importantly, however, the
district court in White never even drew the distinction between

commercial and noncommercial activities in upholding the Access
Act. Therefore the White court adhered to a procedural conception
of Lopez.
Another district court, in United States v. Lucero,32 addressed

the constitutionality of the Access Act under the Commerce Clause.
As in White, the court in Lucero distinguished Lopez by arguing
that, unlike the Gun-Free School Zones Act, the Access Act regulates activities that substantially affect interstate commerce due to
the interstate movement of medical supplies and the interstate travel of employees and patients.3' The Court argued that unlike the
Gun-Free Schools Act, the Access Act "regulates conduct which,
by its very design, threatens a particular type of commerce-the
provision of reproductive health services. ' 3' Of course, this is
exactly the argument that the district court in Wilson raised to
invalidate the Access Act. The Wilson district court, however, had
argued that the Access Act does not seek to regulate the reproduc-

tive health clinics, which the district court conceded Congress
could regulate, but instead the private conduct affecting those facilities? 24 The Lucero court directly responded to this by arguing
that Wilson erred when it "focused on the non-commercial na-

Act in part based on the argument that abortion clinic violence was beyond the control of
state and local authorities. See White, 893 F. Supp. at 1433. By contrast, the problem of
guns in school zones was already adequately dealt with by the State of Texas. See Act of
Apr. 12, 1871, 12th Leg. R.S., 1871 Tex. Gen. Laws (current version codified at TEX
PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.19(a)(1) (West 1995)) (prohibiting firearm possession on, or
within 300 feet of, the premises of a school); Tx PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.03(f) (West
1995) (providing that such offenses are third-degree penalties). There was no mention in
both the Ffth Circuit and the Supreme Court opinions about the inability of local authorities to deal with the problem.
On the other hand, even the Seventh Circuit in Wilson conceded that merely finding
that a problem is national in scope does not give Congress carte blanche authority to
regulate it. Wilson, 73 F.3d at 683. Moreover, other evidence suggests that anti-abortion
protesting is adequately dealt with at the state and local level. L at 699 (Coffey, J.,
dissenting) (citing cases in which state statutes have been used to convict anti-abortion
protestors).
320. White, 893 F. Supp. at 1433.
321. 895 F. Supp. 1421 (D. Kan. 1995).
322. See id. at 1423.
323. Id. at 1424.
324. See Wilson, 880 F. Supp. at 628.
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ture and purpose of the regulated activity itself rather than the

effect of that conduct on interstate commerce." 3
The Lucero court's emphasis on the effect of an activity on
interstate commerce, rather than the nature of that activity, is

grounded on the procedural conception of federalism in Lopez. It
draws support from the fact that the Lopez Court upheld its New
Deal jurisprudence. In fact, the Lopez Court quoted from cases like
Wickard, where the Court stated that even if Filburn's "activity [is]

local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still,
whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce." 3 Unfortunately, by

grounding the Commerce Clause analysis on the effect of an activity on interstate commerce, rather than on the nature of that activity, the court fell into the trap of the unlimited enumerated power.

If Congress is simply left to determine whether an activity has a
substantial effect on interstate commerce, then there is no real limit

on Congress because every human activity affects interstate commerce as every human activity can have economic effects.?'
Thus, every human activity would potentially be subject to the
commerce power?" This Note, by contrast, shifts the Commerce

325. Lucero, 895 F. Supp. at 1424 n.2 (emphasis added).
326. Wickard v. Flburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942) (emphasis added) (quoted in Lopez,
115 S. Ct. at 1628). Thus, the Court in Lopez implied that the economic effect of an
activity, rather than its nature, is the important Commerce Clause inquiry. Cf. Judge Louis
H. Pollak, Reflections on United States v. Lopez: Foreward, 94 MICH. L. REV. 533, 547
(1995) (arguing that "the relevant inquiry would not be whether gun possession is
'economic' but whether it has substantial economic consequences").
327. Professor Calabresi points out how this "is not a profound observation or a novel
insight." Calabresi, supra note 217, at 802. "[I]f you follow the chain of causation far
enough everything seems to affect everything else." Id. (citing Wickard, 317 U.S. at 12325, 128-29). In fact, economics has been defined as the study of "rational choice in a
world [where] resources are limited in relation to human wants." See RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 3 (3rd ed. 1992) (citing GARY S. BECKER, THE
ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1976)). Thus, education can be seen as
economic since "it involves investment of time and resources in the accumulation of
knowledge and skills for future use in work and other activities." MeJohn, supra note
146, at 27 (citing GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPrrAL (2d ed. 1975)). Even the activity
of a homemaker can be considered economic activity because it involves cost-such as
the homemaker's time. Therefore, if Congress can regulate any economic activity, it can
regulate homemaking since the services provided by homemakers dearly have a substantial
effect on the national economy.
328. If all human activity is subject to Congress' commerce power, then there is
virtually no role for the judicial department aside from ensuring that Congress satisfies
procedural requirements, such as legislative findings, jurisdictional elements, or clear
statements, before exercising its commerce power.
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Clause inquiry to the nature of the activity in question, rather than
the effect of that activity on interstate commerce. The next section

relies on this approach as a way to secure meaningful limits to the
commerce power.
I1. A PROPOSAL

AND APPEAL FOR SUBSTANTIVE LMfTs
ON THE COMMERCE CLAUSE

A. The Commercial Activities Test
The commercial activities test is a workable proposal grounded
on the substantive conception of Lopez. Itfocuses not on the effect
that an activity has on interstate commerce but rather on the nature
of the activity itself as a means of articulating substantive, categorical limits to the commerce power. The linchpin of the proposal
involves developing a distinction between commercial activities and
noncommercial activities and then applying that distinction to the
activity in question 29 Under the commercial activities test, if the
"activity is commercial, the 'substantial effects' jurisprudence applies, allowing Congress to regulate the activity if, in the aggregate, it substantially affects interstate commerce; otherwise, the
doctrine0 is inapplicable and affords Congress no basis for regula33
tion.
Unfortunately, for all the commentary generated over the meaning of Lopez, there has been a dearth of commentary on how to
begin distinguishing between commercial and noncommercial activi-

329. If there is one criticism of this Note's proposal, it is that it appears to draw an
artificial distinction between commercial and noncommercial activities. See, e.g., Nagel,
supra note 15, at 649 (labeling as "superficial" the distinction between commercial and
noncommercial activities because even the latter have substantial effects on interstate commerce). However, when it comes to constitutional limitations, principle must not be sacrificed to practicality. There may be room to quibble over the Framers' constitutional design. However, the remedy is to amend the Constitution through the amendment process.
330. United Stated v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 591 (1995) (Becker, J.,concurring in part
and dissenting in part), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 681 (1995), and cert. denied 116 S.Ct.
750 (1996). Ironically, the dissent in Bishop, after arguing that the commerce power only
reaches commercial activities after Lopez, proceeded to carve out a huge exception that
swallows up the rule. The dissent argued that "non-commercial enactments .. .should be
upheld only to the extent that adequate data, available either by way of congressional
findings or otherwise, establish that the proscribed non-commercial activity has a sufficient
relationship to interstate commercial activity." Id. at 592. However, Congress's power
under the Commerce Clause should strictly be limited to commercial activity only, regardless of how substantial its effect is on interstate commerce. Under the Constitution, certain
activities are properly left "to the individual States, notwithstanding these activities' effects
on interstate commerce." Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1642 (Thomas, ., concurring).
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ties. This is not surprising, given the conflicting signals as to
whether the Court was even articulating a substantive conception of
federalism and especially given the Court's loose use of language.
For example, the Court in Lopez seemed to conflate the terms
"economic" and "commercial."33' The Court cited Wickard as an
example of congressional regulation being upheld "[w]here economic activity substantially affects interstate commerce." 332 However,
if the Court were truly grounding Congress' power under the Commerce Clause on the basis that it can regulate economic activities,
then the commerce power has no limits because all human activity
has economic effects.33 It would have been more appropriate for
the Court to label Roscoe Filburn's activity in Wickard as commer334
cial since Filbum was a commercial farmer.
Thus, this Note's proposal attempts to clarify the difference
between economic activities and commercial activities. It posits that
all human activities are economic since all activities have some
economic or commercial effect on interstate commerce. As Justice
Kennedy argued in Lopez, "In a sense any conduct in this interdependent world of ours has an ultimate commercial origin or consequence."335 However, while all activities may be economic activities, not all activities are commercial activities. This is because, as
defined below, not all activities are directly associated with a commercial transaction or a "voluntary economic exchange. ' 3 ' The
procedural conception of Lopez fails to appreciate this commercial/economic distinction and thus permits Congress to regulate
virtually every human activity-a fundamental inconsistency with a
system of enumerated powers.

331. Cf. McJohn, supra note 146, at 26 (noting that "[tihe Court made no attempt to
define what it meant by 'economic' and 'commercial,' as though the terms needed no

further definition").
332. Lopez, 115 S. CL at 1630 (emphasis added).
333. See supra note 327 and accompanying text.
334. See Merritt, supra note 158, at 710 n.145. Indeed, Roscoe Filbum sold some of
his wheat. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 114 (1942). Thus, Roscoe Filburn could
properly be classified as a commercial actor based on his practices and the anticipation
that he would likely sell more wheat in the future. On the other hand, merely because an
individual was once involved in a commercial transaction at one time does not mean that
the individual could still be classified a commercial actor once the transaction has been
completed. Otherwise, every individual who, at one time, was involved in a commercial
transaction would be a commercial actor. The proper distinction must be drawn. See infra
Part il Section B.
335. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1640 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
336. United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 602 (1995) (Becker, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (emphasis omitted).
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The need to articulate limits to the commerce power, of course,
should not lead the Court to adopt a limit for its own sake. Rather,
any limit must draw support from the text of the Constitution
itself-its general structure and the principles underlying it, as well
as the early judicial interpretations of the Commerce Clause. In
other words, true limits must be found in the Constitution, not in a
justice's own conception of the commerce power. As a logical
starting point, then, it is crucial to examine the text of the Constitution itself, or more specifically, the term "interstate commerce."
When Chief Justice Marshall first construed the term in Gibbons,
he focused on its "interstate" prong in order to hold that the commerce power does not extend to intrastate commerce.337 Today,
one might validly argue that the concept of "intrastate" commerce
has lost all meaning in a modem, highly integrated economy.33
Nevertheless, the word "commerce" still imparts meaning and provides a limit to the concept of "interstate commerce." The commercial activities proposal, in this regard, has its foundation in the
Constitution. It is no small coincidence, in fact, that the term
"commercial" bears such a close resemblance to the term "commerce" since "commercial," literally, means "[o]f or pertaining to
'
commerce [or] engaged in commerce."339
In addition, "commercial" means "having profit as a chief aim."' Thus, it is possible
to arrive at a properly limited definition of "commercial activity"
by reconstructing the meaning of "commerce" in "interstate com34
merce." '
To this end, the Framers' understanding of the term "commerce" provides guidance. At the time the Constitution was ratified, for example, "commerce" was understood to include such
activities as buying and selling, bartering, trading, transporting, and
traffic.342 An early judicial definition of "commerce," provided by
Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons, then grounded the term in a
conceptual framework. Marshall argued that "[c]ommerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more: it is intercourse. It de-

337. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824).
338. See supra note 259.
339. AMARICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 297 (2d ed. 1987). Black's Law Dictionary
defines "commercial" as: "[rielates to or is connected with trade and traffic or commerce
in general; is occupied with business and commerce." B ACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 270
(6th ed. 1990).
340. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 270 (6th ed. 1990).
341. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3.
342. See Lopez, 115, S. Ct. at 1643 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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scribes the commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of
nations, in all its branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules for
'
carrying on that intercourse."343
This definition presupposes some
sort of interchange between two entities. Implicit in this concept is the notion that the activity is somehow voluntary. Indeed,
this "voluntary" feature finds support in the fact that the Framers
never intended for the Commerce Clause to function as a national
police power to federalize every local crime. 4 Thus, it is necessary to delineate between activities of a criminal nature, which are
coercive, and those of a commercial nature, which are voluntary.
Based on this conceptual framework, the sine qua non of
"commercial activity" must be some sort of voluntary commercial
transaction or economic exchange between two entities, having
profit as its chief aim.3" Concededly, this definition of "commer-

cial activity" is still abstract and therefore must be placed in concrete form through application. Thus, the next section explores the
contours of the commercial activities standard and reveals its implications for federal law by applying it to several hypotheticals as
well as to several federal statutes. First, however, the next section
articulates a concept known as the "lens of federalism." This concept serves as a useful device for properly applying the commercial
activities standard in the face of the modem trend toward federalization.

343. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189-90 (1824) (emphasis added).
344. In fact, an alternative definition of "commerce" is "sexual intercourse." AMERICAN
HERITAGE DICTIONARY 297 (2d ed. 1987).
345. Cf. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1642 (Thomas, J., concurring).
346. Viewed from this standpoint, it is possible to reconcile the Court's recent decisions
in Terminix and Robertson with Lopez since both of those cases clearly involved commercial activities. Terminix involved a commercial transaction-a termite extermination contract between an exterminator and a homeowner. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies v.
Dobson, 115 S. Ct. 834, 837 (1995). Robertson involved a business actually engaged in
commerce. See United States v. Robertson, 115 S. Ct 1732, 1732-33 (1995). Moreover,
Robertson can be classified as falling within the second category of the Court's tripartite
framework for defining Congress' commerce power. See supra notes 131-35 and accompanying text. The gold mine in Robertson was engaged in interstate commerce. See Robertson, 115 S. Ct. at 1733. By contrast, the Court argued that "[t]he 'affecting commerce'
test was developed ...
to define the extent of Congress's power over purely intrastate
commercial activities that nonetheless have substantial interstate effects." Id. (emphasis
added). The Court's rhetoric, once again, implies that a distinction between commercial
and noncommercial activities is necessary.
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B. Application of the Commercial Activities Standard
There is a real dilemma with how to define "commercial" so
that it is neither so narrow that it returns us to a "horse-and-buggy
definition of interstate commerce," 7 nor so broad that it leads us
to the paradox of the unlimited enumerated power. Obviously, a
court may face uncertainty as to the precise nature of an activity
the closer it gets to the boundary between commercial and noncommercial activities. Yet it is at this point that a court must analyze the nature of an activity under the "lens of federalism."3
Employing this concept, courts must analyze the nature of an activity based on the premise that there are "real limits" on the commerce power and that the Constitution does not extend to Congress
a national police power. 49 This will ensure that the commercial
activities test will not be compromised by labelling everything
"commercial."
For example, the Third Circuit, in United States v. Bishop,"o
upheld the federal carijacking statute 35' on the basis "that
carjacking, a violent criminal activity, is a commercial transac'
tion."352
Yet, as the dissent correctly pointed out, the majority ran
"afoul of the Lopez Court's admonition that any definition of
'commercial' must be one that provides 'real limits' on the scope
'
of Commerce Clause authority."353
Indeed, Chief Justice
Rehnquist in Lopez cautioned that "depending on the level of generality, any activity can be looked upon as commercial."3 4 While
Rehnquist may have conflated the terms "economic" and "commer-

347. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Press Conference in Response to Supreme Court Decisions
Overturning New Deal Legislation, 31 May 1935, in 4 PuBc PAPERS AND ADDRESSES
OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 200, 221 (Samuel L Rosenman ed., 1938).
348. "Federalism is the lens through which the commerce power must be viewed."
Wilson, 73 F.3d at 698 (Coffey, J., dissenting).
349. See Lopez, 115. S. Ct. at 1642 (Thomas, J.,concurring).
350. 66 F.3d 569 (1995).
351. 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1994).
352. Bishop, 66 F.3d at 591 (Becker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
353. Id. at 592 (citing Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1633). The dissent added that "[t]he
majority's arguments prove far too much" because under the majority's definition of
"commercial transaction," Congress could perhaps criminalize "nearly all criminal activity

occurring within a state." Id.
354. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1633. Ironically, the Court's opinion contradicted itself by
arguing that the Gun-Free School Zones Act had "nothing to do with 'commerce' or any
sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms," since "of
course one might define those terms broadly enough to include gun possession." McJohn,
supra note 146, at 26-27 (citing Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630-31).
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cial," the relevant point is that the commercial activities test must
not be construed so that Congress can regulate virtually every
activity. Otherwise, the "lens of federalism" concept would be
undermined. At the other extreme, however, the standard must not
be construed so that it effectively guts the commerce power either.
The lens of federalism must also allow for a viable commerce
power in a modem economy.
Proceeding with this understanding, then, it is apparent that the
commercial activities standard cannot be limited to the actual commercial transaction itself since this would construe the Commerce
Clause far too narrowly. Congress must also have the power to
regulate those activities leading up to the commercial transaction,
essentially those activities carried on with an anticipation of the
commercial transaction. Based on this definition of "commercial
activities," Congress would have the authority to regulate most
aspects of interstate businesses, including the minimum wage of
employees, working conditions, safety standards, and hiring policies, since the culmination of all of these activities is a product or
service offered to consumers. Business enterprises are safely within
the commercial activities sphere. Thus the minimum wage regulations of such enterprises are not as problematic as the minimum
wage and overtime regulation of state employees at issue in National League.355 However, the commercial activities test would
not necessarily restore the result in National League since the
employment agreement between a state employee and the state is a
voluntary economic exchange entered into for profit-a commercial

activity.
This is not to say that Congress can regulate every aspect of
state public schools, police and fire departments, and other similar
state institutions. On the contrary, Congress cannot 6 Entities
like public schools, for example, are not parties to a commercial
transaction unlike private schools are that receive funding from private individuals through contractual arrangements rather than from
property taxes. Although Congress would have regulatory authority
over commercial transactions entered into by public schools, such

355. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
356. Of course, a substantive conception of the Tenth Amendment, like that in National
League, could further limit the power of the federal govermient. However, the Tenth
Amendment may have more value not as a sword to strike down legislation within
Congress' sphere of authority, but as a shield to ensure that Congress' commerce power
is not interpreted to encompass virtually all activities of the states. See supra note 112.
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as when public schools purchase school supplies, it would not have
power to set curriculum standards, hiring policies, and so forth,
since these activities are not conducted in anticipation of a commercial transaction?.3 Thus, where Lopez expresses concern that
Congress might use the commerce power to regulate areas like
education, "where States historically have been sovereign, 3' 8 the
commercial activities test would, for the most part, preclude such
interference. Indeed, one of the benefits of this Note's commercial
activities proposal is that it dovetails with the concern for protecting traditional state prerogatives. Under the proposal, congressional
regulation of the family, education, and local crime would be severely restricted. Yet these are precisely the areas that Lopez identified as peculiarly within the province of the states." 9
As applied to the Court's standing jurisprudence, this commercial activity framework might still be consistent with cases like
Wickard because, while Roscoe C. Filburn grew wheat for home
consumption, his excess wheat was likely sold in interstate commerce. ° Thus, the Agriculture Adjustment Act could be constitutionally applied to Roscoe Filburn. On the other hand, if Roscoe
Filburn grew wheat purely for home consumption, Congress would
not have a basis to regulate that activity under the commercial
activity test. Congress, for example, could not regulate backyard
gardens because, while such gardens are economic activities since
they affect the interstate market by reducing demand,"6I they

357. While public schools, for example, might be engaged in the stream of commerce,

an argument supporting Congress's power to regulate public schools based on that rationale proves too much. As the district court in Wilson observed, all persons and entities
operate within the stream of commerce. United States v. Wilson, 880 F. Supp. 621, 630
(E.D. Wis.), rev'd, 73 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 1995). It is not enough that schools are economic enterprises. They must also be commercial activities.
358. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632.

359. Id.("Areas such as criminal law enforcement or education [are areas] where States
historically have been sovereign."); see id. at 1632-33 (expressing the concern that Congress might be able to regulate aspects of family law, including marriage, divorce, and
child custody, based on the rationale that such activities affect national productivity); id.
at 1640 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[lt is well-established that education is a traditional
concern of the States.').
360. Roscoe Filburn's practice was "to sell a portion of the crop; to feed part to poultry and livestock on the farm, some of which is sold; to use some in making flour for
home consumption; and to keep the rest for the following seeding." Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U.S. 111, 114 (1942).

361. Cf id. at 128 (explaining how home-grown wheat influences price and market
conditions). Gardening is economic activity because it has economic effects. But it is not
commercial activity because individuals do not seek to sell their vegetables.
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would not be commercial activities. Similarly, Congress would not
have a basis to regulate a homemaker's duties because, while the
activity when taken in the aggregate with other similarly situated
homemakers clearly has a substantial effect on interstate commerce,
it is only economic activity, not commercial activity. The activities
are not performed in anticipation of a commercial transaction, like
the planting of seeds in Filburn's field. Thus, under the substantive
conception of Lopez, a highly important limitation is placed on
Congress' commerce power. No longer may Congress use the
aggregation principle to widen the regulatory sphere over any activity in order to satisfy the substantial effects test. 62 The ambit of
Congress' regulatory authority would be limited strictly to commercial activities.
Along the same lines, Congress would not have a basis to
regulate other private activities of Roscoe Filburn, such as his
personal lifestyle. Although his lifestyle may affect the quality or
quantity of goods he produces for the interstate market, the commerce power cannot reach so far back that any activity which
influences the quality of a commercial transaction may be subject
to regulation. Congress cannot be afforded the power to regulate
activities prior to commercial "intercourse." Simultaneously, at the
other extreme Congress' power cannot extend to activities subsequent to the completion of the commercial transaction.363 Once
the commercial transaction ends, the nature of commercial activity
also ends. Thus, Congress cannot criminalize the mere possession
of drugs following a purchase. The commercial transaction in that
case has ended. However, Congress can regulate the actual sale of
drugs as well as the possession with intent to sell, since the latter
activity leads to the commercial intercourse. Hence, the Drugs-Free
School Zones Act, which prohibits "distributing, possessing with
intent to distribute, or manufacturing a controlled substance" in a

362. See supra notes 205-18 and accompanying text.
363. The pure exchange of money does not necessarily complete the commercial transaction, at least not when it deals with providing services as opposed to goods. Thus, one
individual may pay another individual money up front in exchange for services over a
period of time. The commercial intercourse would continue until the services are completed. On the other hand, an individual who is performing a service with the anticipation of
getting paid would be a commercial actor. Interestingly, Alfonso Lopez may have fallen
in this latter category because he apparently received the gun from an individual named
Gilbert who said he would pay Lopez forty dollars for delivering the gun to another
individual named Jason. See United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1345 (5th Cir. 1993),
affd, 115 S. CL 1624 (1995).
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school zone3" would be constitutional since these activities are
conducted in anticipation of commercial intercourse. By contrast,
the Gun-Free School Zones Act, which criminalizes mere possession of guns,3" would be unconstitutional because while the antecedent purchase of the firearm involves a commercial transaction,
that transaction ceases at the point of sale. The subsequent possession of the gun in a school zone could not properly be defined as
commercial activity.3"
The commercial activity test would have a serious impact on
other federal criminal statutes as well. Criminal statutes like the
Hobbs Acte67 and the Anti-Car Theft Act,3 for example, would
be unconstitutional because Congress would be regulating activities
that do not involve a voluntary commercial transaction or exchange. The fact that individuals employ such means as extortion
or carijacking to personally profit would not change the inherently
coercive, involuntary nature of such activities. They are noncommercial activities and are properly left exclusively to the jurisdiction of the states-not to a national police power.369
However, unlike extortion or robbery, Congress would still
have authority to regulate securities fraud under § 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934370 and Rule lOb-5 promulgated
by the Securities and Exchange Commission."7 While fraud involves "[a]n intentional perversion of truth" or "concealment...
intended to deceive another,"3T I the underlying transaction is still
entered into voluntarily. Fraud differs in nature from coercion,
which is defined as the use of actual or threatened force, violence,
or fear--"where one party is constrained by subjugation to
[an]other to do what his free will would refuse." Unlike fraud,
coercion compels compliance involuntarily.

364. See 21 U.S.C. § 860 (1994). The Drug-Free School Zones Act was upheld following Lopez. See United States v. Garcia-Salazar, 891 F. Supp. 568 (D. Kan. 1995).

365. See 18 U.S.C. § 922 (q)(2)(a) (1994).
366. The district court in Garcia-Salazarnoted this distinction and argued that "[d]rug
trafficldng is inherently commercial in nature; firearm possession is not." Garcia-Salazar,
891 F. Supp. at 572.
367. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (1994).
368. 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1994).

369. See Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1650 (Thomas, J., concurring) (the Constitution "does not
cede a police power to the Federal Government").
370. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994).
371. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1994).
372. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 660 (6th ed. 1990).
373. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 258 (6th ed. 1990).
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The issue of loansharking in Perez thus presents a unique
problem for the commercial activities proposal. On one hand, such
transactions are entered into voluntarily. On the other hand, employing threats or the use of violence as a means of collection 74
is inherently coercive. Courts facing this quandary would have
several options. They might treat the actual extension of credit (the
voluntary transaction) as distinct from the collection of credit (the
transaction employing coercion) and allow Congress to regulate the
former but not the latter. However, courts may be more inclined to
treat the entire process as a single transaction, thus unifying both
its voluntary and involuntary aspects. 75 This problem exemplifies
the legal uncertainty, noted by the dissent in Lopez,376 that arises
from the distinction between commercial and noncommercial activities. It is unclear how courts should resolve this uncertainty, but
they must weigh several factors, including the built-in presumption
of the commercial activities test that courts view the commerce
power through the lens of federalism.3'
Undoubtedly, the distinction between commercial activities and
noncommercial activities will entail some degree of legal uncertainty, yet the sanctuary of certainty is intolerable if it leaves an enumerated power unlimited. As Justice Thomas argued, "one advantage of the [Lopez] dissent's standard is certainty: it is certain that
under its analysis everything may be regulated under the guise of
the Commerce Clause." ' Such certainty, however, is incompatible with the constitutional system of enumerated powers. Moreover,
even despite the existence of some legal uncertainty, its quantum
will be relatively minimal. For the most part, the application of the
commercial activities test, as confirmed by this Note, is fairly
straight-forward. As applied to the constitutionality of the Access
Act, the answer is unequivocal.

374. See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 147 (1971) (noting that loan sharks use
or threaten the use of violence in enforcement).
375. This seems to be the more logical approach since the entire process, from the
extension of credit to the collection of credit, can be seen as the same intercourse which
extends over a long period of time.
376. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1664-65 (Breyer, L, dissenting). The dissent in Lopez

criticized the majority for its holding because "it threatens legal uncertainty in an area of
law that, until this case, seemed reasonably well settled." Id. at 1664.
377. See supra notes 348-49 and accompanying text. This is where Professor Merritt's
fuzzy logic approach to "interstate commerce" may aid courts. Merritt argues that judges
"must decide what degree of 'commerce-likeness' will satisfy the constitutional definition
of interstate commerce." Merritt, supra note 158, at 744 (footnote omitted).
378. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1650 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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C. Closing the Commerce Clause Door to the Access Act
The Access Act, as an exercise of the commerce power,"9 is
clearly a congressional overreaching of power under the commercial activities test. The abortion protesters targeted by the Access
Act are not part of the commercial intercourse between the clinics
and the patients. In fact, abortion protesters cannot even be placed
on either extreme of the commercial activity continuum, whether it
be the pre-commercial activities extreme, as Roscoe Filbum's personal lifestyle would be, or the opposite extreme where the transaction has ended-as with the mere possession of guns near schools
following a purchase. Instead, the anti-abortion protesters are perpendicular to the commercial activity continuum. They seek no part
of the clinics' commercial intercourse. Instead, they intend to disrupt it. Abortion protesters also fail the other prong of the commercial activity test because they do not have profit as their chief
aim. Even though they may seek to financially injure the clinics,
their chief aim is to prevent abortions, not to profit monetarily.
Therefore, abortion protesters are only economic actors, not commercial actors. They engage in civil disobedience, the control of
which should be properly left to the exclusive jurisdiction of the
states' criminal laws under their police powers, not to a federal
Access Act under the commerce power.
CONCLUSION

Although the Framers developed a system with overlapping
spheres of authority between federal and state government, they
also envisioned a system where the respective governments would
act independently of one another. The modem formulation of the
Commerce Clause, however, has skewed this constitutional balance
and has emasculated the system of enumerated powers under the
Constitution. The Janus-faced approach of the Court's jurisprudence
since the New Deal has done violence to the constitutional scheme
when it, in theory, pledged allegiance to constitutionally mandated
limits under the Commerce Clause, but in practice, displayed the
contradiction of the unlimited enumerated power. Unfortunately, as
long as Congress can regulate all human activities which exert an

379. An alternative source of authority to enact the Access Act may be found under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. For an analysis that this provision also cannot
support the Access Act, see United States v. Wilson, 880 F. Supp. 621, 634-36 (E.D.
Wis.), rev'd, 73 F. 3d 675 (7th Cir. 1995).
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economic effect on interstate commerce, its power will remain
unlimited.
This Note proposes that substantive constraints, rather than
procedural limitations, must guide the Court in fashioning a limit
to the Commerce Clause following Lopez. It proposes that the
commerce power must be limited to commercial activities, rather
than merely economic activities, as supported by the structure of
the Constitution itself and reflected in the term "interstate commerce." Under the commercial activities test, certain spheres of
activity would be outside the scope of the commerce power, notwithstanding their effect on interstate commerce. Under this test,
the Access Act is exposed as another intrusion on state prerogatives.
While some critics will be hostile to the resurrection of substantive, categorical limits to the commerce power, this Note's
proposal represents an appeal to the Court to place principle above
practicality. It represents an appeal to preserve the role of the
states in the Framer's constitutional design. Naysayers will decry
such a proposal as dangerous formalism or criticize the Court as
being proactive for unsettling sixty years of stable Commerce
Clause jurisprudence by adopting a commercial activities requirement. In reality, however, the Court would actually be operating
reactively because it would be protecting fundamental constitutional
principles. In the end, it means no less than preserving the integrity
of the system of enumerated powers-the fountainhead of our
constitutional structure.
STEVEN

A. DELCHJN

